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STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY REGARDING U.S. AIRCRAFT PARTICIPATION IN NATO CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OPERATION

Two U.S. Air Force F-16C aircraft, part of the NATO operation over Bosnia, provided close air support to United Nations personnel in Gorazde today at 1622 GMT (10:22 EDT). The F-16C aircraft are part of the 512th Fighter Squadron of the 86th Fighter Wing which is deployed to Aviano, Italy, from Ramstein, Germany.

UNPROFOR military observers in Gorazde, under attack from Serbian artillery, asked for NATO air protection, and following the approval of Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the two aircraft dropped three Mark 82, 500-pound bombs under the control of a UN forward air controller.

Since July 22, 1993, NATO forces, operating as an extension of Deny Flight, have been prepared to provide UNPROFOR with protective air cover, if requested. This protection is the result of UN Security Council Resolution 836. The UN has deployed a number of forward air controllers to accompany UN units. These controllers are equipped with communications equipment which enables them to direct NATO aircraft to ground targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As I have described, there are three ways in which the U.S. is supporting NATO through the use of air power: the Deny Flight operation; air strike ultimatums, such as the Sarajevo model; and close air support, which was used for the first time today. This use of NATO air power was intended to protect the UNPROFOR forces who were being endangered by the shelling of Gorazde. We believe that was an appropriate and effective use of NATO air power, and are prepared to use it again, if asked by UNPROFOR.

More generally, we believe that the Serbs should cease their attacks on Gorazde and resume talks on the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia.

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
 INTERVIEW WITH JIM LEHRER ON PBS-TV PROGRAM, "THE MACNEIL/LEHRER NEWSHOUR"
 PENTAGON
 APRIL 11, 1994

JIM LEHRER: We go first tonight to the NATO air strikes against the Serbs in Bosnia, and our coverage begins with a newsmaker interview with the Secretary of Defense, William Perry.

Mr. Secretary, welcome.

SECRETARY PERRY: Thank you, Jim.

LEHRER: First, as we speak now, what is the situation around Gorazde? Has the shelling by the Serbs stopped, continued to be silent?

SECRETARY PERRY: The shelling has stopped. We don't know yet whether the Serbs have decided to give up the shelling or whether they've just stopped for the evening. I think we'll find that out tomorrow morning.

LEHRER: Are we in contact with them? Is there communication with the Serbs?

SECRETARY PERRY: Very limited communication with the Serbs.

LEHRER: All right. If it does start up again, we're prepared to strike again? Is that correct?

SECRETARY PERRY: I want to clarify that. We're not the ones really to make that decision. First of all, General Rose, the U.N. Commander, has to decide that the situation warrants calling for close air support. If he calls it, then NATO will respond. And if our airplanes are the ones that are conducting the air cover at that time, then our airplanes will be the ones that will conduct the strike.

LEHRER: So, neither you nor the President nor anyone else in the United States Government has to sign off on any further air strikes, any more than you did on these first two.

SECRETARY PERRY: That's exactly right. And we did not on the first two.

Our decision was made at the time we authorized and approved the resolution, which was done by NATO. We were one of the countries, of course, that approved that resolution. That resolution gave the NATO Command the authority to take these actions in response to a request from the UNPROFOR, from the U.N. forces in Bosnia.

LEHRER: But is it -- do you understand, from the U.N. and thus the United States joint position, that the message that's going to the Serbs is, "If you continue to do this, we will continue to do what we're doing"? Is that a message that should be read that way?

SECRETARY PERRY: That message should be read that way. Secretary Christopher stated that very clearly in an interview today. I will state it very clearly now.

LEHRER: So, if the air strikes do begin again -- if the shelling continues at Gorazde, these air strikes, like the two yes -- one today, one yesterday, will continue as well.

SECRETARY PERRY: If the shelling continues and if General Rose believes that these threaten U.N. forces there and requests close air support, then NATO will provide it.

LEHRER: Okay.

Now, the raids today involved two American planes, two Marine planes. Is that correct?

SECRETARY PERRY: That's correct. F-18s.

LEHRER: Now, how did that come about that they were American planes both days?

SECRETARY PERRY: Well, there are, oh, about half of the airplanes in this NATO air fleet that's set up to provide this close air support, about half of them are Americans. And we alternate providing the cover, the air cover, which goes on for 24 hours a day over Bosnia. And it was the luck of the draw that it happened to be American planes at that time.

The follow-up mission, which was the bomb-damage assessment mission yesterday, was done by a French Mirage plane.

And so it could happen -- it could be a French, it could be a British, it could be an American or it could be a Dutch. Those are the four nations which have airplanes in that fleet.

LEHRER: How many bombs were dropped today on this second...

SECRETARY PERRY: I'm not sure of the exact number. It was a number fewer than ten.

LEHRER: Fewer than ten.

SECRETARY PERRY: Yes.

LEHRER: And we don't know how many rounds. Do you know how many rounds were fired in addition to that?

SECRETARY PERRY: No.

LEHRER: What about casualties on the ground?

SECRETARY PERRY: We don't know, don't have any reports of casualties on the ground. We believe that three of the vehicles that we were striking were hit and were damaged.

LEHRER: That was a tank and two armored personnel carriers?

SECRETARY PERRY: Yes. That's the report we have.

LEHRER: Were they moving? Is the assumption that there were people in them?

SECRETARY PERRY: We don't know that.

LEHRER: I assume that the planes, the American planes, got back to base.

SECRETARY PERRY: Yes, they did.

LEHRER: No injuries?

SECRETARY PERRY: No problem with the planes.

LEHRER: Same yesterday, as well?

SECRETARY PERRY: That's correct.

LEHRER: Now, is there any information on the raids yesterday? Now, yesterday the raid ended up being on a command post. Is that correct?

SECRETARY PERRY: That's correct. There were tanks firing. The planes went to the area. The tanks were behind cloud cover at the time. They couldn't pick them out. But there was a command post in the immediate vicinity and the pilots struck the command post instead. And we believe that they destroyed the command post.

LEHRER: Is it correct to say, Mr. Secretary, that the real purpose here was not really to destroy the Serbs' ability to conduct military operations, it was to send a message? Is that correct?

SECRETARY PERRY: Well, the primary purpose, the primary purpose was to protect the U.N. peacekeepers in Gorazde, who were being affected by that shelling. One of them was actually injured a few days ago. The shelling was going on. As it continued in

Gorazde, it not only imperiled the citizens of Gorazde, it also imperiled the U.N. forces that were there. And it was on that basis that General Rose called for the air strike.

Now, there will be obviously indirect effects, some of them positive, some of them negative, from that. The positive is we hope that this will send a message to the Serbs which suggests to them that it's best to stop that shelling and come back and negotiate a cessation of hostilities. That was the -- that was in process. That negotiation was in process at the time this shelling began.

There can also be an indirect negative effect, which is that the Serbs may believe, may interpret this action as the United Nations acting against them, entering the war against them. And that is not correct. The United Nations is there as a peacekeeping force and they were operating under that mandate. They're not trying to enter the war on one side or the other.

LEHRER: But as a practical matter they have, have they not? I mean aren't they now -- isn't the United Nations and, through the United Nations, the United States on the side of the Muslims?

SECRETARY PERRY: No. The United Nations and NATO, in support of the United Nations, are there to enforce the peacekeeping mandate, and in particular to support Resolution 836, which is protecting the safe haven areas and protecting the U.N. forces that are in those safe haven areas.

LEHRER: Now, how many U.N. forces are actually in Gorazde who are in jeopardy?

SECRETARY PERRY: I don't know the exact number but it was a relatively small number, probably less than 15.

LEHRER: And who are these people? What nationality? What are their arms? What are the capabilities and assignments?

SECRETARY PERRY: Well, they will be lightly armed. They're probably a mixture of different nationalities. And their assignments are there to support the peacekeeping operations. And in particular, there is a forward air controller group there that is there to assist in protecting these groups by calling for close air support if necessary. And, of course, it was that forward air controller that actually oversaw the -- that actually directed the missions which we conducted.

LEHRER: One of those people that...

SECRETARY PERRY: Yes.

LEHRER: And what -- I mean, you say one of them was injured. Who made the judgment that the lives of these U.N. peacekeepers were in jeopardy and said, "Call in the air support"?

SECRETARY PERRY: General Rose. He is the commander of the U.N. forces in that area and he made the judgment that his forces were endangered, and he had the authority then to request it. That has to go to the U.N. commander in that area, which is General de Lapresle. And the first time that he made that request, it also went to the civilian U.N. authority, Mr. Akashi. That was all provided for in the original U.N. resolution that set this up.

LEHRER: From beginning to end, how long did it take? From the time that there was some sign that close air support was necessary, in somebody's opinion who had the authority to say so and the time the planes actually dropped their bombs, how long transpired? Do you know?

SECRETARY PERRY: I understand that yesterday, the first time this was done, it took about an hour, all told, and that for the whole political approval process to take place. I believe it was much quicker today, because they did not have to go -- they did not have to seek additional validation from the political authority this time.

LEHRER: When did you and the President find out about this?

SECRETARY PERRY: We found out about it after the fact. The resolution does not envision going to political authorities in the nations and seeking their authority. The resolution -- when the nations approved -- in this case, it was the NATO nations. When they approved the resolution to provide this close air support, they turned over to the NATO Command the authority to respond directly to requests from the U.N. And that's the only way, really, that a close air support can operate.

LEHRER: Is that fine with you?

SECRETARY PERRY: Yes, it is. And it's fine with the President.

Now, Mr. Yeltsin made the point that it was not fine with him. He wanted to have been consulted ahead of time. But the Russians should understand it was not only they that were not consulted ahead of time, but neither were the Americans and the British and the French forces that are there.

LEHRER: As Secretary of Defense of the United States, you did not afterwards say to somebody, "Hey, look. I know you didn't have to tell me. I know you didn't have to get my authority, because of all the resolutions. But when we send U.S. troops into harm's way, I'd like to know about it"?

SECRETARY PERRY: We made that decision at the time we agreed to the resolution. We turned that authority, we delegated that authority to the military command there. We can withdraw that delegation. If we do not like the way it's being executed, we can pull out of the operation, of course.

LEHRER: But you have no complaints up to...

SECRETARY PERRY: We have no complaints. We think that both the U.N. and the NATO execution of this resolution has been professional and been very well done, executed.

LEHRER: All right. Let's take -- try to look ahead now. You said there's a possibility that there could be some negatives involved in these air strikes. In fact, there were reports -- maybe you could clarify them -- that the Serbs have tightened up around Sarajevo and there are other signs of troop movements around, that maybe the Serbs may not run and hide on this, they may escalate the thing.

Is that possible?

SECRETARY PERRY: There are at least two kinds of negative reports to date, but it's very early to come to a conclusion.

The first is, there have been some reports in Sarajevo of the interference of free action, free movement by U.N. forces there.

And secondly, they continued the shelling today after the close air support yesterday. Now, the shelling, as I've indicated, has stopped tonight.

LEHRER: After the second air raid.

SECRETARY PERRY: After the second. But we don't know what's going to happen tomorrow morning.

I think -- I want to reserve judgment on what the Serb reaction to this really is until I see what happens tomorrow and the next day.

LEHRER: How prepared are the NATO/U.N./U.S. forces, all together, how prepared are they for escalation beyond just one or two planes dropping bombs and doing some strafing runs?

SECRETARY PERRY: Well, we have,

NATO has well over a hundred planes in this air fleet. So we have a formidable air armada there, more than is necessary to conduct the operation we've been conducting to date. So it would be a very big miscalculation for the Serbs to believe that this was a force which was limited to conducting an occasional close air support mission. We could conduct much more than that if necessary.

We don't believe and we hope that that's not going to be necessary. We were not trying to engage the Serbs in a war. We're not trying to enter the war on a side against the Serbs. We're only trying to carry out the U.N. resolution, which they're doing as part of their peacekeeping operation.

Our major objective -- and I think Secretary Christopher made this very clear today. Our major objective is to get back to the negotiations for a cessation of hostilities. We believe we were very close to that last week and we'd like to get back to that position.

LEHRER: But let's say that doesn't happen, Mr. Secretary, and let's say that this kind of game continues -- and I don't mean to make light of it by calling it a game, but this tit-for-tat continues. How far along in the tit-for-tat can it go, by just General Rose on the ground calling the shots, before it becomes a major undertaking of the United States of America?

SECRETARY PERRY: We're operating under a very clear resolution, Jim. It's both a NATO and a U.N. resolution, which not only gives us the authority to take the actions we've taken, but it also limits the authority of -- it limits the actions we can take.

The actions we're taking are three categories right now. The first is the close air support, which we have seen demonstrated in the last few days. The second is enforcing the no-fly zone -- that is, shooting down any tactical airplane that rise in Bosnia. We saw that demonstrated a few months ago -- a month ago. And then the -- besides those operations, we have the ultimatum which prevents artillery from firing into Sarajevo. And if the artillery were to -- if there would start to be artillery fire in Sarajevo, we could -- we would -- we are

authorized to attack artillery.

That's all we're authorized to do under these negotiations.

LEHRER: And the close air support, the first option, the one that was used today and yesterday, is based on the additional condition, is it not, Mr. Secretary, that U.N. forces have to be under attack? In other words, if the Serbs had continued to bomb Gorazde but had not targeted the U.N. troops, those 12 or 15 troops in Gorazde, this would not have happened? Is that correct, technically?

SECRETARY PERRY: Well, I wouldn't want to draw too fine a distinction there. The U.N. troops are in Gorazde. Artillery or tanks are shelling Gorazde. Everybody in Gorazde, to a certain extent, is endangered and under attack. That could be sufficient reason alone.

So, if you have a safe area, which Gorazde is, and if you have U.N. troops that are in that safe area, then it's very difficult to draw a distinction between when you are protecting the safe area and when you're protecting the troops that are there to protect the safe area. And that's the situation we have in Gorazde today.

LEHRER: And so, as a practical matter, you would like the Serbs to understand that if they're going to bomb an area where there are U.N. troops, the close air support condition is viable.

SECRETARY PERRY: That's exactly right.

LEHRER: So anywhere near there.

SECRETARY PERRY: Yes.

LEHRER: All right.

Let's clear up one final thing, Mr. Secretary.

You and General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took some heat for some statements...

SECRETARY PERRY: We did indeed.

LEHRER: ...that you all made, saying that there was no military role there for the United Nations forces, or words to that effect.

Has something changed, or what's happened?

SECRETARY PERRY: No. No.

nothing has happened. My remarks, I'm sorry to say, were misunderstood. What I said was, in response to a question of would we keep Gorazde from falling, was I said we would not -- the question: What would we do to keep Gorazde from falling? I said we would not enter the war.

Now, what I meant by that was that we would not enter the war as a combatant on one side or the other. But in the same interview I also repeated what I've discussed with you tonight, which are the three conditions under which we would provide air support. And indeed, we're doing that. I also suggested that we might even consider extensions of those if the military condition deteriorated further.

But I was very clear that I supported, and I continue to support, all three of these applications of NATO air power in support, in support of U.N. peacekeeping missions, not in support of the United States entering the war as a combatant.

LEHRER: And that is your position and the President's position tonight, is it not, that we have not entered the war?

SECRETARY PERRY: That is correct. That was my position then and that's my position now. And that's also the President's position.

LEHRER: All right.

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

SECRETARY PERRY: Thank you very much, Jim.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
INTERVIEW WITH THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF BUSINESS WEEK MAGAZINE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
APRIL 11, 1994

Secretary Perry: Let me add a little bit to the bio. One of the things I think worth noting is that I did own my own company back in 1974, and was the president of it... When I went with the government the first time, (inaudible) electronics company. The investment bank took my company and after I left the government I went back and worked for them as a managing [partner].

Finally, the [development firm] that I (inaudible) before I came into the government, while I was also at Stanford, was not an unusual business. Good marketing (inaudible). We were (inaudible) defense conversion. All the companies by the late '80s were beginning to understand the shrinking market and looking for ways to diversify, and (inaudible). While I was doing that, I was working simultaneously with Stanford to help try to facilitate defense conversion in Russia, (inaudible). So (inaudible).

Let me start off by giving you what I think are the three major objectives I'm trying to achieve as Secretary of Defense. At the time I finish my term and look back, I'd like to see what my legacies are, some measure of success or failure. Other people will measure me lots of ways, but these are the ways I will measure myself by how well I've done on achieving these objectives.

The first one that's easy to express and hard to accomplish is to keep the world from drifting back into a Cold War again. We have made enormously important gains from the national security point of view, as well as an economic (inaudible) point of view, by the end of the Cold War. We don't have that nuclear cloud hanging over our head. It's so important that we should not pocket that and forget about what an important achievement that was. Yet, the new (inaudible), this project -- every day we read reports of new incidents, new problems, new political developments in Russia, which could cause a relapsing into a government there which could be hostile to the West, could be militaristic.

So, when I say not letting the world drift back into that, I mean doing something about it. We cannot control what happens in Russia today, but we can strongly influence it, and I think our government has a real responsibility to try

and do that. One of the things I've put a high priority on, my own time and effort, is pushing programs which can have an important influence on Russia, to keep them on the path of reform. To keep them on the path of political, social and economic reform. The thing that we can do most effectively there is help them in defense conversion.

A trip that I took to Russia, just a few weeks, ago was focused on two different ways we've been working with Russia. One of them is in defense conversion, and the other is in the dismantling of nuclear weapons. I've tried to nail down the gains we've made in actually getting rid of, destroying these weapons. I (inaudible) successful in both regards.

So, that's one big objective, and I wrap all that around keeping us from drifting us back into a Cold War.

The second big objective is achieving some real understanding and applying that understanding of how we use military power in the ambiguous peacekeeping operations that are attendant with the post Cold War era. A recurring example of that -- Somalia was an early example. But my fundamental observation is that every military operation with which we've been involved since the end of the 2nd World War has had limited political objectives, and we have used our military power selectively in order to do it. That's a very difficult issue.

For years after the Korean War -- the debates still rage as to whether we limited our use of military power properly. There it hinged over MacArthur's assertion that we should have used nuclear weapons. In Vietnam, did we limit our use of military power (inaudible). [We inherited] the (inaudible). Had we unleashed our military, let them do what they wanted to do with them. In every major peacekeeping operation we've been in in the last few years, that has been an issue as well.

In Somalia (inaudible) very clearly, and a very selective use of military power. Particular (inaudible), revisiting whether (inaudible) Somalia, which was the firefight on October 3rd. We had, in Somalia, at that time, sufficient military power that we could have eliminated Aideed, and all of his clan, as a military threat. If we elected to use our military power that way. We chose not to, because to have done that, since you couldn't tell Aideed supporters from non-Aideed supporters, would have simply meant devastating a major part of the population of Mogadishu. That really symbolized the kinds of problems that we have in using military power as a peacekeeping operation.

Now we're facing a similar issue in Bosnia. How far should we go? Yesterday we conducted an air strike. This morning we conducted another air strike. It might even be still going on. And the issue, one way of describing the issue here is, while we want to continue providing full support to the UN peacekeeping operations, which is what NATO is there to do, we do not want to get drawn into a war on one side or the other. That's the danger of the operation underway right now.

Q: Was the air strike (inaudible)?

A: We attacked several tanks that were shelling Gorazde.

So, that is a very, very difficult question, one we've never had (inaudible). All of the debate and discussion on Bosnia, in particular, has been characterized by (inaudible) simplicity of the real complexities. It's not a question of do we have the military power, are we man enough to use it. It's how do you selectively use military power when your political intentions are very, very limited.

The final objective I have, observing, again, this post Cold War era. Observing that since the 2nd World War we have had two major drawdowns of military strength -- one between 1945 and 1946, and another after the Vietnam War -- and we screwed those up badly, I assert. I'd be [happy] to discuss why I think that. Now we're working on the third drawdown. This time we've got to get it right. Getting it right means what do we do to give it the best chance of (inaudible).

I came into this job with the belief that we have (inaudible) legacy of the most effective military force in the world. We want to preserve that legacy even as we reduce the size of the force. At the end of this century, the end of the decade, we'll have a much smaller military force, but unit-to-unit, person-to-person, [we ought to be] just as effective, if not more effective than (inaudible). What do we have to do to achieve that?

First is a very careful and particular emphasis on preserving the legacy of the quality and the professionalism of people. The all-volunteer force, which we have today, is truly the best in the world. There's nothing like it in any other military anywhere. All of the senior leaders of other countries that I've dealt with -- Russia, United Kingdom, France, Japan -- when they meet and come in contact with the U.S. force, they come away (inaudible). The way they put it is, the NCOs in the American military forces are so much better than in any other force in the world. That gives us an enormous advantage.

So, the first problem is, as we bring down the size of the force, how to preserve the quality, professionalism, training of the people.

The second is, how do you keep the leadership (inaudible). We've got absolutely splendid leadership. I have a snapshot of having worked with the leadership in the '70s and now working with them again in the early '90s. They're very much more effective, very much more capable. We want to maintain the effective leadership.

The final is how do we sustain our defense industry through this drawdown so that what comes out at the other end still supports the nation in terms of providing defense (inaudible) [or] equipment for our forces. Again, (inaudible). That's a whole complicated set of issues there that have to do with reforming the acquisition system, with sustaining that (inaudible). It has to do with overseeing the consolidation of the defense industry. It's compressing by more than a two-to-one factor right now. We see acquisition mergers, companies going out of business. We have a big interest in the outcome of all of that. While we don't orchestrate it, there are things we can do that will give us a better chance that the outcome a few years from now will be favorable to us rather than unfavorable.

We have to maintain some aspects of the defense industry. An example that I've given before was the nuclear submarines. We have to maintain the capability to build those uniquely defense items even as we reduce the inventory for the submarines. I've taken the position, which is very controversial in the Congress, that we will continue to build nuclear submarines at a very, very low rate. Even though we [don't need any more]. Even though the inventory doesn't require (inaudible) for years to come. That will be a very, very (inaudible) debate in Congress. I believe that that's (inaudible). I plan to make it, and I will make it on the basis of preserving our industrial base.

But, by arguing to preserve the industrial base, it's not a WPA program. It's very selectively picking out capabilities which are unique to defense, which you cannot find (inaudible), and preserving those. Then taking the big bulk of (inaudible), which are really dual use, and making it possible to buy them anywhere in the country instead of this very selective and hermetically sealed defense industry. That requires integrating the rest of the defense industry into the national industrial base.

In order to do that, that goes back to the first point I made, which is acquisition reform. In order to do that, we have to change our procurement regulations, number one; and number two, we have to change our (inaudible) in the military. Otherwise we won't be able to get access to that whole (inaudible).

That's a long-winded introduction. But those are the three things that I consider are my primary objectives in my job as the Secretary, and by which, when I leave this job seven months from now, or many years from now, I can look at it and say I either achieved or didn't achieve those, or (inaudible). That would be how I measure success.

Q: On the issue of the difficulties of (inaudible) military power in peacekeeping operations, currently (inaudible) in Bosnia. What is the danger that NATO air strikes will be seen by the Serbs as very much an intervention, and that the Serbs will, again, continue to try to test NATO resolve by continuing their own [military] operations?

A: That's a danger. It's been a danger from the beginning. Every time the UN has asked for and NATO has agreed to provide military support, that's a risk NATO and the U.S. take. So far, we've been able to handle that without, as I... A phrase I have used in the "Meet the Press" interview was "without entering the war." What I meant by that was we do not want to become a participant on one side or the other in the war. We have to be able to draw this fine line between supporting the peacekeeping operation, which is trying to take an objective stance, to minimize civilian casualties while we're moving towards a peace agreement. That's what the UN peacekeeping operation (inaudible), and entering the war on one side or the other.

Up until now we have been able to keep it [separate]. There are certain responses to this air strike yesterday by saying, by (inaudible) we have entered the war. We have to continue to assert our position that we have not. That this action, the action that was taken by NATO yesterday with U.S. airplanes, was in response to a request from the UN, based on UN resolutions which are peacekeeping resolutions -- they're not warfighting resolutions. I had a talk this morning with the Russian Minister of Defense Grachev, explaining it to him. I think he understands it. And asking him if he could use whatever good (inaudible) he has with the Serb military to add another voice to saying that what we are doing is strictly a peacekeeping operation, as part of the support of a UN operation.

Having said that, I believe that General Rose's request was correct. I support it not only in fact, but in principle as well. I believe the actions the Serbs were taking outside of Gorazde were egregious. That's been declared as a safe haven area. They moved their tanks up and they were shelling the city, including the UN forces that were in it.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: What we will do is respond the way that the UN... If General Rose [comes back] to NATO and asks for more air strikes, we will provide them. We

think we're entirely, not only correct in doing that, but clearly the UN resolution (inaudible).

Q: (Inaudible)

A: The answer, in simple terms is no. But (inaudible). One of which has to do with how to provide (inaudible) support peacekeeping operations -- not focused on Bosnia, but general peacekeeping operations. In particular, (inaudible). We have (inaudible) because the United States has not appropriated the funds which we use to pay our UN dues. And we are in arrears hundreds of millions of dollars in UN dues. Since we see the U.S. peacekeeping operation as an important part of United States policy, we feel it's very important to (inaudible) that. That was one kind of issue being discussed. We also talked about foreign assistance programs and how to provide support for them. We, not surprisingly, (inaudible).

Q: You characterized the Russian government (inaudible) to the NATO (inaudible).

A: I'm also limited on what I can say on that, because the agreement we have with the Russian government on the use of this hotline back and forth (inaudible). We're free to discuss the topics we've covered, but not [give conclusions or recommendations]. We have (inaudible) retain confidentiality.

We have asked our attaché there to work out a Memorandum of Agreement about what was said, and then if he agrees to release that, we will then be free to release it.

One of the subjects of discussion had to do with (inaudible), [back] into Bosnia. There was understanding on both parts that this was a legal action within the resolution. The question was... Both of us could agree that it was heading in an undesirable direction. So, the whole issue is what could they do and what could we do [to get the shelling] stopped so that we could stop the air strikes. (Inaudible) I was soliciting the Russian government's support for going into the Serbs and getting them to stop the shelling. He was understanding of what I was telling him, that we would continue to provide support on the air strikes. [That's as much as I can say].

Q: How does the nature of the air strikes (inaudible)? What is the level of escalation (inaudible)?

A: Without going back to the NAC, the NATO assembly, and getting more authorization, within the present authorization we can respond only to requests of the UN for close air support. In other words, UN forces under attack or in danger, they would call the NATO air [to come in for a strike on] the tanks or the artillery

people that are causing the attack. That's the authorization that we're working on at this time.

If the Serbs escalate to start to shell Sarajevo, then a different resolution is invoked. We are then free (inaudible). We [are then able], if that happens, to [commence] an attack on artillery positions all over the area. That has not happened yet, but if that (inaudible).

The third resolution, which (inaudible) [military] action, I don't think it was invoked in this case, but the third resolution is the so-called no-fly zone. Shoot down any aircraft (inaudible). If the Serbs were to send a military airplane up, we'd shoot them down, too.

So, those are the three different, [give the authority] for taking aggressive action. I don't believe we need more resolutions. [But I think it takes time to] (inaudible) [enforcement of the resolutions], and (inaudible) requested by the United Nations. And secondly, getting the Serbs engaged in discussions which would lead to a cessation of hostilities (inaudible) on Gorazde and (inaudible).

Those discussions have been ongoing and they're fairly close to conclusion. This latest event is a real setback from that point of view. We thought the Serbs were very close to (inaudible).

Q: Secretary Perry, you've outlined why acquisition reform is so important to the defense industry, and (inaudible) future. I wonder if you can bring us up to date on where things stand now. There are some folks in industry that are concerned that although (inaudible) has been made from within the Pentagon and on Capital Hill, in their eyes, (inaudible) don't go far enough. And despite the push from the top, they haven't seen enough implementation on the ground (inaudible), move away from MILSPECs or buying commercial products. (Inaudible)?

A: [My arbitrary statement], 50 percent of the (inaudible) legislative (inaudible), and 50 percent (inaudible). Even if the legislation turns out to be poor or weak, the other 50 percent is still (inaudible). We're moving with quite a lot of energy in that direction. The most significant of which, and the one you will see (inaudible) is military specifications -- changing the ground rules under which program managers can buy hardware. There's been already some substantial changes made in that area. My goal is by the end of the year to have the regulations changed in such a dramatic fashion, that anybody would (inaudible).

So we still have the prospect of getting 50 percent of (inaudible) by things we do internally. If we don't do that well, we have nobody to blame but ourselves. I believe we will. A lot of it's going more slowly than I would have liked it to be

going. But as I said, I think there will be very substantial progress evident by this summer, and certainly by the end of the year. [Most of it's underway].

As far as the other half of it, the legislative aspect, I have recently (inaudible). My question is not whether we'll get a bill, but whether the bill will be so watered down by the time we get it that instead of getting that whole 50 percent we end up getting only 10 to 20 percent. I think that is... I'm trying to maintain my optimism on that. But each week it seems more evident that that bill gets watered down [more and more]. It still has a lot of processes, a lot of steps (inaudible) Congress before we get the final report. My concern is in each one of those steps only tends to weaken it further, not to strengthen it. I don't see amendments or modifications being made to make it tougher, it's the other way around.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: Because, to keep it objective, to really allow us to go out and buy defense equipment almost anywhere, to integrate the defense industry with the national industrial base. You have to have [contracting] companies that are like commercial contracts. If you insist on putting into these contracts one or 20 or 50 amendments which are designed to achieve social or economic objectives that the government has, no matter how worthy those objectives are, they detract from the ability to do commercial buying. That's (inaudible). Everybody who wants to support one of these worthwhile objectives thinks that the best way of doing it is by putting it as a rider on Defense Department contracts. The Buy American Act. Even if you support the Buy American Act, the question of what that does to your buying practices, if you insist on sticking that in as a rider to the contract, it's not so much how it affects the [prime contractor], but how it can trickle down to all of the vendors.

One possible line of defense for us here is getting an agreement that all of these provisions can apply to the prime contractor but are not passed down to subs, so that we keep that huge second and third tier subcontractor base at least available for commercial buying practices.

Q: From what you've seen of legislation so far, and what is happening (inaudible), do you think that at the end of the day there will be a significant decrease in the cost to the Department of Procurement, and an increase in (inaudible)?

A: Yes, I do. That's from two [different aspects]. Very different issues, really. The first is, if we can get, to the extent we can convert over to commercial buying practices, we reduce the cost of buying the overhead, the infrastructure that (inaudible). So, that will save us a lot of indirect money. Secondly, to the extent we can get specifications (inaudible), we will have access to products that are cheaper

on a unit basis. The most dramatic example of that that I can give is the semiconductors. If you take a chip, certain functional specifications, and you insist on using MILSPECS to buy it, you've increased your cost by about a factor of ten. I don't mean ten percent, I mean a factor of ten. A \$2 chip becomes a \$20 chip. The difference of the other \$18 is buying paper, and buying [special testing] procedures. The testing itself isn't what costs so much, but documenting the tests is (inaudible). That all costs a lot of money. Industry, a long time ago, has dropped all of those elaborate testing and documentation procedures. They concluded you get better reliability by (inaudible), by the process, not by (inaudible).

So, those are two different ways you will save money. A combination of each one of them is certainly (inaudible) a couple of [billion] dollars a year that [we'll save].

Q: Can I ask a question about our policy towards China. Whether you believe there will be a satisfactory resolution over the issue of Chinese meeting human rights concerns stipulated in the executive order, and whether, if there turns out to be a confrontation, is there a revocation of MFN or something less than a cooperative end of this, whether it will have an adverse affect on China's role in discouraging North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, which I understand is playing quite a constructive role?

A: First of all, trade policy and human rights policy with China is really not my area of responsibility, so I wouldn't want to make a non-informed comment on that subject.

But, getting to the point that you were really raising, how does it couple with security issues that we have with China. I don't think so. I have not seen any evidence, to date, that the Chinese are as strong on linkage as we're as strong on linkage. We're linking human rights to trade, for example. They think that's...they argue that maybe we should not make that link. But by the same token, they would argue that you should not let foreign policy and national security issues (inaudible). They will take whatever action they're going to take (inaudible) based on their own assessment of the national security policy.

Now, my opinion on how the Chinese will see the North Korean problem is, they do not want North Korea to develop a nuclear weapons program. They certainly do not want to see a war get started on the Korean Peninsula.

The first point is a subjective view that's hard for me to prove, but I have had [Chinese leaders] tell me that. The second one I think is self evidence. China's big interest and their big success story in the last (inaudible) has been their economic development. A significant part of that has been with East Asian neighbors, and in

particular with South Korea. So, if you end up with disrupting trade in Eastern Asia and in particular with Korea, it will have an adverse economic impact on China. So, I think they have in their own self-interest a desire to inject some kind of a calming effect on what's going on on the peninsula today, and try to restrain North Korea from moving forward with a nuclear weapon program. I don't think they want to (inaudible) on our side and working that process. In fact, to the extent they are seen as being on our side, it probably weakens their hand in dealing with North Korea.

Q: But you have reason to believe that they are working through their quiet means or however to pressure the North Koreans not to develop weapons?

A: I believe that's the case. I have no evidence to support that belief other than what Chinese leaders tell me, and they can have their own reasons for wanting to put a gloss on the story. And from my assessment of where their national interests lie, I have no idea what Chinese leaders are saying to North Korean leaders, and vice versa. I don't know of anybody that does. That's a very hard one to get a handle on.

Q: (Inaudible) that it's not cutting back its military spending (inaudible) quite heavily in the past year. How do you view (inaudible) military modernization? Is this the first step for China [starting to throw its weight around militarily] in the region, or is it just upgrading equipment. Is this something we need to be concerned about?

A: I think the latter. Not because, again, I don't have any special insight into what the Chinese military leaders are thinking, but I see that they started off with a very antiquated military, the equipment in their military is very antiquated. At one time I was probably the Western world's expert on the Chinese military. In 1980 I visited every major defense plant in China at their invitation, and (inaudible). That was a long time ago. But in 1980 there was a year's (inaudible). I also saw the equipment they had in their units and the airplanes and bombers and fighter aircraft, engines, that they were antiquated. So, I think they were probably long overdue on modernization.

During the '80s, after this trip, a big part of their effort was not on modernizing the military, it was trying to get their (inaudible). They made a conscious decision to pour their resources into (inaudible). I think now that they've succeeded in that, they're now going back and trying to catch up with two decades of (inaudible). That's my reading on that.

Q: Can you tell us what is being said [about] the North Korean situation? The Chinese, we think, are playing a constructive role. There is (inaudible) so far that (inaudible). Where do things stand?

A: If the Chinese are playing a constructive role, we don't see any concrete results from it. If what the North Koreans are doing is constructive and useful and positive, I'd hate to see them in a [negative way]. These are the guys that called me the war maniac. So, I've become a little [passionate] when I speak about the North Koreans. Their behavior in the recent round of talks (inaudible), everything they could have done to put a stick in our eye and then (inaudible). They have not only not allowed the IAEA to conduct the inspection that the IAEA wanted to do; they didn't allow them to conduct the inspection which they had agreed to allow the IAEA to do before that. (Inaudible) That was just number one.

Number two, they agreed on an exchange of envoys with South Korea, relative to North/South talks, and they backed off of that. They did this with a letter to the UN which suggested that the UN is a hostile body. You sort of think back to the [1950] days when the UN was, of course, the leader of the (inaudible). We're back in '90, (inaudible). You've read the records about South Korea, (inaudible). So, all of this is behavior not calculated to win the hearts and minds of the international community (inaudible).

I can't imagine what they might have done with (inaudible). Now the question is whether we can get back to where we were at one time. We really had achieved something substantial at one time, which was the agreement between North and South Korea to have a nuclear-free peninsula. This goes well beyond the IAEA. And you can make an argument as to why it might be in North Korea's best interest to have that [be so]. So, somehow we need to get back to that position, and we're struggling now for a strategy which will allow us to do that.

Q: Is there a time limit on this? I mean [weapons can be developed] while we talk.

A: There are [three] events which will happen along the way. There's one event which we have no way of knowing what's happening, is if that they have enough plutonium, we believe, for one or two bombs. We don't know what's happened to that plutonium. We assume they're making bombs with it. So, somewhere along the line they're going to get that bomb or those two bombs completed, and maybe put in a weapon system. We can only speculate when that might happen. So, that's a discreet event but not one we have (inaudible) on.

A second discreet event is they have this 25 megawatt reactor in Yung Sang. It's about ready for reloading fuel. In a couple of months' time they've got to do that again or [pull the fuel out of it] (inaudible). At that time, that plutonium will go into a cooling [box], and will cool for some amount of time, maybe a month or two. And then it goes from there to we don't know where. It could become like the other plutonium, it could disappear, and from that point on we'd never know whether

they made bombs with it, or what the progress was on the bombs. Or it could, as we have sort of demanded they do, and which they've agreed to do under the (inaudible), they could put it under the UN's control.

Once that fuel goes out from under UN control, there is no way of (inaudible). As long as it's in the reactor, as long as it's in the cooling process...

Now to get to your point. The date by which they put this in the cooling [pond] and then later take it out, it measures so many months from now -- three, four. Up until that point, we can talk. When it comes to pulling that fuel out of the cooling [pond] and moving it somewhere, we've lost the opportunity to (inaudible).

The other major event is to have a 200 megawatt reactor [being built]. At such time as they complete that and load it with fuel, then (inaudible), that would lead towards production of plutonium which could ultimately support a bomb-building program of 10 or 20 bombs a year.

So, all of these events are [in front of us]. The single most significant event, though, coming up in the future is the transferring of that fuel out of the reactor to wherever it's going to be transferred.

Q: What do you recommend that we do? (Inaudible)

A: We're recommending that we exert every diplomatic strategy (inaudible). To try to A, get that fuel under control as one objective; and two, resurrect the North/South talks along with the agreement that they create a peninsula that's nuclear free. Secretary Christopher has a whole string of specific alternatives, step by step, that he's (inaudible).

My recommendation from a defense point of view, without trying to prescribe the diplomatic strategy for doing it, is that this is the single most important thing we could be doing right now, (inaudible). All of the alternatives are bad, really bad, including (inaudible). [Sanctions are] not an attractive alternative. For one thing, we're not at all sure how effective [sanctions would be], particularly if China (inaudible). And secondly, even invoking the sanctions, even discussing the invoking of sanctions has let North Korea say that sanctions would be considered an act of war.

We can simply shrug that off and say that's rhetoric, but we have to take, at some level we have to (inaudible).

Q: (Inaudible)

A: I'm hopeful that (inaudible).

Q: Is anybody trying to track down the (inaudible) pilot that (inaudible)?

A: The only (inaudible) is the hope that logic and sanity will prevail. There are a lot of these alternatives (inaudible) that are worse for them than they are for us and South Korea. But you would have to (inaudible).

Q: Is this a multilateral-only option, [the military aspect], or is this an issue that could, under some circumstances, transcend our desire to (inaudible)?

A: I think the answer to both those questions is yes. There's no strategy we can carry out with North Korea that can be (inaudible) South Korea, and with a certain extent, even with Japan. Whether we're talking about diplomacy, about (inaudible), military options. All of them have to be done somehow in conjunction at least with South Korea, with Japan, and all of them involve, in an important way, some of them indirect but in an important way, China. So, it is a multinational issue.

But, in terms of how we would confront North Korea on the nuclear issue, the United States has [unique pressure capabilities] (inaudible).

Q: (Inaudible) motivation of the North Koreans are? Clearly they stand to lose more, at least a rational person would draw that conclusion. (Inaudible) How are you actually calculating what they're up to?

A: I wish we had better insight into that. I have (inaudible) people who are students of North Korea, (inaudible) opinions. But I think even the North Koreans, in general, don't have the answer to that question. It's not just that we don't know, but within North Korea the leadership is isolated, not only from the rest of the population, but even from their own government, to an extent which we have a hard time comprehending. Much of the answer to your question hinges on what's in Kim Il Sung's mind, and to some extent Kim Jung Yung's mind. But, I don't know many people who have great insight into that. I know people who have talked to them (inaudible), but they tell them what they want them to know.

I've also seen reports and analyses which indicate that the younger Kim is almost beyond help in terms of [actions]. His actions have been so erratic, [people] are having a hard time trying to (inaudible) [transfer of power]. None of those things [encourages] our ability to devise a strategy based on offering them (inaudible) to which they'd respond appropriately.

I guess what I would say is, the conclusion I would come to is that we should not be rigid in our approach to the problem. We should learn, step by step, as we go along.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I have a budget-type question. (Inaudible) last year that the Bottom-Up Review did not identify more areas of the [budget to cut out]. There was a much higher expectation generally that the peace dividend would be higher. I'm wondering if you had any plans to revisit the idea of the Bottom-Up Review, or perhaps revise the criteria that so limited the (inaudible).

A: The correct answer to your question is yes, but the correct answer may be a little misleading. There are several areas in the Bottom-Up Review, several areas that do not have (inaudible). And at the end of the review, we [spelled] those out and said we have to have some additional [funding] which, when they're completed, will essentially be added to the Bottom-Up Review and (inaudible). One of those areas is the whole nuclear force structure and the counter-proliferation area. So, that study, the nuclear proliferation (inaudible) was started a few months ago and will this summer...

Q: (Inaudible)

A: It was a posture review. We'll end up with a report sometime this summer which, among other things, will spell out what our force structure ought to be, or we'll be able to (inaudible) in terms of nuclear weapons and bombers and missiles to carry them for the next decade or so, what those forces ought to be, and the (inaudible) implications. And (inaudible) from that. That then was [postulated] in the Bottom-Up Review. It also conceded that we didn't do the industrial base study (inaudible). (Inaudible) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security [just had a hearing] a few weeks ago (inaudible) this week. So, that study is ongoing now, and that includes, among other things, a fairly detailed investigation of what we should do about (inaudible). There might be some additional savings that could be achieved there.

Finally, BRAC-95 has just started up, the preparations just started a few months ago, and that will go on to reach a grand climax (inaudible) March of next year when we submit our BRAC (inaudible) to Congress. [There's big expense involved in the] (inaudible) infrastructure which BRAC-95 will (inaudible).

So, if you think of the Bottom-Up Review as a living document, then those are the three major annexes to the Bottom-Up Review. (Inaudible) Any one of them could have substantial fiscal implications. Most of the pressure we get on the nuclear posture (inaudible) is that the baseline assumptions we made about [that] which were made before we had done the [Bottom-Up Review], we understated what we needed in terms of forces, and therefore overstated (inaudible) very substantial kinds of (inaudible).

Q: (Inaudible) possibility that you'll ever be able to let technology go and (inaudible) nuclear submarine program. If other countries are not building nuclear

submarines, why is it necessary for the United States to keep that capacity (inaudible)? Is there ever a time when we can say we don't need that capability (inaudible)?

A: I'm glad you asked the question that way because I want to clarify what I think is the essence of maintaining the industrial base capacity in places like nuclear submarines, tactical fighters, (inaudible).

The issue in my mind is not whether (inaudible) in a year or so, but having (inaudible) so that we could (inaudible) in a crisis accelerate production and increase the number of tanks or (inaudible) available for [a war]. Any military contingency we have considered would not give us enough time to do that. So, we envision all the military contingencies (inaudible) in the future, they would be (inaudible). They would fight the war with the force that you have.

Therefore, the notion that you could double or triple your production of tanks and airplanes at that point, on the event of a war, is not what we're trying to achieve. What we're trying to achieve is [to go after it a different way]. That is [what if] a Cold War (inaudible)? What if another super power emerges (inaudible) and has a substantial military force? In that case, we would want to go back to the defense industrial capability (inaudible), [but] we would assume we have enough early warning on this (inaudible) so we could do that. So, we're looking at five to ten years of getting that capability going. Focus on those issues which the capabilities [could] be important to us, but we don't want to take more than say five years to get back in [the shape] (inaudible).

I contend that if we shut down our nuclear submarine line and (inaudible), that we could not (inaudible) in even ten years. It's that long of a process, particularly in an area where [nuclear] (inaudible), the environmental process (inaudible) in the United States is formidable. But it's mostly the question of you lose the (inaudible).

Q: (Inaudible)

A: ...except we are developing a [global] tactical fighter. If, for some reason we stop developing (inaudible), then I would argue that we needed the capability (inaudible). I would argue the same thing for [tanks]. It's not even [probable], remotely (inaudible). So far, we've been able to maintain that capability by keeping a tank modification program going which (inaudible) the M1-A3. So, there's enough technology and [processes] involved in that, that that keeps [it] alive.

Q: What about airlift?

A: The (inaudible). The airlift, aircraft have many features that are different from a [transport], fundamentally they're enough the same that I would not have (inaudible).

Q: Why is (inaudible)?

A: We do not have a policy in keeping McDonnell Douglas or any other [manufacturer] alive. My notion of maintaining the defense industrial base does not extend to shoring up failing companies. If McDonnell Douglas goes out of business, they go out of business. If Grumman decides to sell their resources to another company, so be it. We are not trying to shore up and I would not support that concept.

McDonnell Douglas is (inaudible) is because they have a product which the users in the military services really like. [They are] frustrated and angry because it's taking so long to get it, and it costs so much to get it. But fundamentally, they like the product. It's a hell of an aircraft. It looks like they can get that problem fixed.

Q: Can I ask you a related question about the restructuring of the U.S. defense industry? How far are we through this process? How much more is there to go?

A: The process of what?

Q: Restructuring the defense industry in terms of lost jobs, in terms of mergers. Would you say we're halfway through this, three-quarters of the way through this?

A: I think in terms of (inaudible) reductions, we're near the bottom right now. We'll probably see the bottom in '95. So, the worst is behind us in that point of view. But there's been a lag in the consolidation of the industry, so, I don't think... That lag is maybe one or two years, so I think we're going to continue to see consolidations and business (inaudible) after the bottom is reached.

Q: But in terms of defense being a drag on the economy, you'd say the worst of it is close to order?

A: [Yes, very definitely.]

Q: (Inaudible) a number of industries for which the U.S. commercial base is not adequate. (Inaudible) I wonder, you mentioned the role for DoD and the (inaudible) of industries with (inaudible) industries and perhaps (inaudible) technologies, or trying to acquire some of that from Japan (inaudible).

A: There are only a relatively few technologies that I would want to apply special protection to from that point of view. Almost the entire electronics industry, and (inaudible), the entire computer industry, will (inaudible).

Q: (Inaudible) [Almost the entire semi-conductor industry].

A: That's a difficult question, (inaudible). I think a good argument can be made to (inaudible). But there's enough commercial reasons for keeping (inaudible). As long as there's a commercial (inaudible) issue, we will go along with it and we'll provide special (inaudible). The special features of (inaudible). It took like a (inaudible). It's not worth making a trip to get there, but if you're in town, it's worth (inaudible).

There are a few clear examples. [Some of the] materials used in stealth, for example, we will [shelter] (inaudible) industry for doing things like that. But those are getting fewer and fewer today. There was a time when the Defense Department (inaudible) composite materials in airplanes, but now you see composite materials being used by (inaudible), and probably the technical leadership for (inaudible).

The night vision equipment is probably another example of where the needs and interests of the Defense Department are so specialized that we will continue to provide some protection, for that aspect to...

Q: You were asked about the former Soviet Union. I was wondering how worried you were about the tensions between Russia and Ukraine, particularly some of the things (inaudible) recently; and also the political instability in both of the countries. What the implications (inaudible). I'm also concerned about the situation in the Russian military itself.

A: I'm very concerned about all of those things. In terms of the Ukrainian/Russian problem, the United States, so far, has played a very useful role as a mutual friendly intermediary, helping the Ukrainians and Russians come together on issues that they might otherwise not have been able to agree on. The most prominent example of that was the summit agreement reached by Yeltsin and Kravchuk in January in Moscow which provided an agreement whereby Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons, 2,000 or so bombs and warheads, which they've been willing to do for some time. The catch was, in order to get them dismantled they had to send them to Russia and (inaudible). The second catch was they wanted reimbursement. They believed they owned the bombs, and therefore the uranium and the plutonium in them, they ought to get paid for.

I believe that might never have been reached between those two countries. It was like a very ugly property settlement in a divorce that you just couldn't get the two parties together. We played a very useful role in that.

There's an interesting story about how all that evolved. I wasn't personally involved in (inaudible), but I saw (inaudible).

Most recently, when I was in Ukraine, the Defense Minister and President Kravchuk asked me if we, the U.S., would be willing to serve as an intermediary in helping them resolve the (inaudible). My answer was yes, in the same sense as on the nuclear question. That is, if both Russian and Ukraine come to us and ask us to perform that role and think we could be useful in doing it. We cannot be useful if one or the other parties don't want to resolve it that way, or they don't think we could be unbiased. So, that is still a possibility that we might be asked to do that. I'd be willing to do that if both countries (inaudible). That's a very important role for the United States to play, but in order to play that role we have to (inaudible). The minute one of them sees that we favor the other, then we lose our ability to (inaudible).

Q: A number of defense companies are interested in what seems to be a (inaudible) in the law enforcement area. Do you think there is (inaudible) companies can (inaudible) that area?

A: I don't have enough information on that, on what the extent of the law enforcement market might be (inaudible). [I can't give you an answer to that question]. I know that after the Vietnam War, during that period, many companies were trying to diversify went (inaudible) and actually did very well in this. But that was (inaudible), and the companies decided to do (inaudible). The big issue though, is getting into (inaudible).

Q: (Inaudible) upcoming trip to Korea and Japan, and Japan has recently launched defense policy review. (Inaudible) on what the U.S. would like to see, what changes, if any, the U.S. would like to see in Japan's defense posture? For example, should the U.S./Japan (inaudible) treaty (inaudible) more responsibilities for Japan [i some ways]?

A: I don't think so. I've followed this pretty closely through the years, and back in the late '70s, when I was in the Pentagon, I was pushing for just that approach. I wanted the Japanese to expand their (inaudible) and take more responsibility for that, and in that process assume more of the burden in the Western Pacific in dealing with the then Soviet threat. Not having a Soviet threat today and not anticipating a Russian threat to be emerging there, I don't see a major advantage, a major (inaudible) in trying to do that. They need to be, and probably are, more concerned about regional threats. North Korea would have to be high [on their list of threats]. The only specific area that I would see that it would be important for them to be improving their defense area is maybe theater missile defense. We have discussed that with them, and (inaudible) collaborative program. We've also discussed one of the other questions (inaudible), technologies change, (inaudible). You couldn't get fair trade unless (inaudible).

I would not (inaudible) which would lead to a (inaudible). Their best interests and our best interests. (Inaudible) percent of the gross national product. It sounds okay to me. That gives them somewhat of an edge over the United States because (inaudible). We also (inaudible). It's also true that, at the time we were making those arguments, they were spending one percent and we were spending six percent of our gross national product. Now we're all the way down to three, three and a half percent.

Q: (Inaudible) ...Whitewater and health care. I wondered whether you feel that he has (inaudible) to [respond] adequately to Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, (inaudible).

A: This will sound like company line, and you have to sort of trust me that I'm (inaudible). But, I'm very impressed with [the President]. Very impressed. I have only worked directly with him now for two months. When I was the Deputy Secretary, I used to meet with him and have discussions with him, but not to the extent that I do now. But, during that time I've been impressed with his grasp of issues, foreign policy issues and national security issues. How we engage in some of those issues, and the fact that we're both willing and able to (inaudible).

Let me give you a snapshot of the last week, which has been very busy. I had a fairly detailed discussion with him Wednesday on Korea. Thursday, I had a fairly detailed discussion with him on Rwanda. And these were one-on-one discussions. They were over the telephone because I happened to be traveling both of those days, but very detailed and very... Calls he initiated, and (inaudible). I met with him yesterday on both Bosnia and Rwanda in the situation room at the White House. This was with foreign policy advisers. I met with him this morning for a couple of hours (inaudible). (Inaudible) His small foreign policy (inaudible), (inaudible). His small foreign policy (inaudible), like Korea, (inaudible). (Inaudible) I wanted to be sure that I understand the message that he wants me to communicate (inaudible). This is not a typical week. This has been a very busy week. But (inaudible) almost every day. [A few] of those times one-on-one, a couple of them small foreign policy groups, (inaudible). So, I would say, based on that one week history, that the President is very engaged. And given the problems that I read about in the newspaper, (inaudible). He's obviously very interested in (inaudible). (Inaudible) these issues I'm talking about are (inaudible).

Q: (Inaudible). What would your (inaudible) North Korea, (inaudible). ...no change in the situation [six] months from now we'll have to (inaudible).

A: Because we would like very much to avoid having to [make] that move. (Inaudible) avoiding taking action, avoiding a confrontation which we don't want and which would not be good for either one of us. (Inaudible) understand that

that's where we're headed. That should be the maximum incentive (inaudible). (Inaudible). The worst thing that could happen is we'd get to that point and we'd find we were out of alternatives, and [we're] both faced with a situation which is likely to be confrontational. We want to do everything we can to try to avoid that, reaching that impasse which would [end in] confrontation.

My belief is that (inaudible), it will involve another (inaudible) action which would be against their own best interest. The clearer they understand, and the greater certainty that they understand that they're heading for that confrontation, then you've created the maximum (inaudible) negotiations (inaudible). (Inaudible) It's not truly the same situation we had back in the late '40s when we signaled to North Korea that we were not seriously interested in (inaudible) South Korea. But it is like it in the sense that they took their actions based on a misunderstanding (inaudible). It would be a big mistake for them and for us if they have underestimated (inaudible). So, I think we ought to lay that out as clearly as we can.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: I think the statement that President Clinton has made [at the same time] (inaudible) too strong in terms of (inaudible), but (inaudible).

Q: I'm sorry. I meant the government in Seoul.

A: Oh, the government in Seoul.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: I'll have a better read on that when I talk to them next week.
(Inaudible)

I don't want to attribute too much to the newspaper accounts of (inaudible). I have talked to (inaudible) recently on the question of (inaudible). He went out of his way to (inaudible), saying that (inaudible) a high level of (inaudible). His reaction to that was, I believe his reaction was very different from the reaction (inaudible). What you get, of course, in South Korea, is that group of people who would (inaudible) in the first place, being [very critical]. (Inaudible) I don't believe that represents anything like (inaudible). Their main concern is [if] the United States is really with them.

Press: Thank you so much for coming.

(END)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
BRIEF REMARKS TO MEDIA REPORTERS FOLLOWING INTERVIEW AT BUSINESS WEEK
MAGAZINE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
APRIL 11, 1994

Reporter: Hi. Thank you for stopping.

Secretary Perry: Sure.

Q: The fighting seems to have increased since the bombing this morning. What do you think that says about the decision to go ahead and bomb?

A: I think the, first of all, the request for the bombing made by General Rose was made in response to the UN resolutions which have existed for some number of months, I think was the appropriate request and I think that the NATO response was appropriate. The Serbs that reacted to this in a violent manner, I think that it's important to convince them that this was a UN action, peacekeeping action, and it was not intended to have UN entering war against the Serbs. It was simply controlling the action which the Serbs were taking in shelling Gorazde, in particular, endangering the lives of the UN forces. So, we have some (inaudible) to explain to the Serbs this action was taken in response to their shelling Gorazde and they should stop that shelling. Not only should they stop that shelling, but the Serbs and the Muslims should move towards a broader peace agreement, cease-fire, cessation of hostilities immediately in Gorazde and quickly thereafter all over Bosnia. That's what we're headed for.

Q: On the Serb point, they're saying that the UN can no longer be a broker in these peace talks and in the conflict in general. What is your response to that?

A: They're wrong on that. Both the UN and NATO are performing an honest broker role and I hope that the Serbs can be made to see that. This was not an attempt to take sides against the Serbs, but was enforcing UN resolution which intended to support the peacekeeping process. That's what we're still driving towards and we believe that's what the UN is driving towards in the peace agreement process.

Q: You tell me there's diplomacy ahead. What do you mean by that?

A: The first thing is to get the shooting stopped and to get the shelling in Gorazde stopped. That will, in effect, stop the air strikes and then we can resume the diplomacy which is already underway. They were having talks to achieve the cessation of hostilities as recently as last Friday.

Q: And the damage assessment, how bad is it?

Thank you very much.

-END-

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COMMITTEE

**STATEMENT OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WILLIAM J. PERRY**

**BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE**

APRIL 12, 1994

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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COMMITTEE

**STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM PERRY
TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
APRIL 12, 1994**

Chairman Nunn and Senator Thurmond:

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee today in support of the President's nomination for the retirement of Frank Kelso at the rank of Admiral. Soon Admiral Frank Kelso will conclude a long and distinguished career. I would ask this committee to reach the conclusion jointly shared by myself as Secretary of Defense, by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of the Navy -- retirement at the rank of Admiral. But before I speak of Admiral Kelso and his nomination I would like to emphasize these points:

- All elements of the Department of Defense have learned an important lesson from the Navy's Tailhook Convention. The environment that produced Tailhook '91 has begun to change in two important ways. First, all DOD Components have clearly and repeatedly proscribed sexual harassment, and have ensured that their personnel are trained accordingly. Second, and perhaps even more important in the long run, we have begun to change traditional military "culture" by assigning women to an ever-growing number of positions. No longer are women relegated to subsidiary or ancillary jobs.
- As Secretary of Defense, I am committed to moving aggressively on both fronts. I have asked the Deputy Secretary of Defense to supervise a task force, co-chaired by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, to reform our complaints process to ensure that cases are resolved promptly and fairly.

Sexual harassment in the military troubles me -- I know it troubles the Members of the Senate Armed Services committee. Women are an essential part of America's all volunteer military force. This all-volunteer military force is the best trained, most capable military in the world. Anything that detracts from the readiness of that force, concerns this Secretary of Defense.

By taking strong action against sexual harassment, and by ensuring that women become full and equal partners in the nation's defense, we will create a culture that is as inhospitable to sexual harassment as it is to racial discrimination. Because of Tailhook, the senior leadership of the Department -- military and civilian -- knows that only full responsiveness and fairness is right. To this end, I would ask that the Department be ultimately judged not on what has happened in the past, but instead how we proceed in the future.

One of the factors that gives me confidence that the Department can deal with this problem is the fact that the senior leadership of the military departments recognize the problem and have developed momentum in dealing with it. At the top of that leadership list is Admiral Frank Kelso. In his capacity of Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Kelso has been aggressive and consistent in addressing this problem.

During his almost four years as Chief of Naval Operations, he has taken the lead with action to deal with sexual harassment:

- In September 1990, he sent a message to all Navy personnel to reemphasize the Navy's "zero-tolerance" policy on sexual harassment.
- In November 1991, he directed the Chief of Naval Personnel to develop new enforcement procedures for the "zero tolerance" policy, including mandatory discharge processing of those found guilty of aggravated or repeated instances of sexual harassment.
- In February 1992, he established new enforcement policies, including discharge processing after the first substantiated incident of aggravated sexual harassment.
- In October 1992, the Standing Committee on Military and Civilian Women in the Department of the Navy announced several steps to enhance professional opportunities and eradicate sexual harassment, including a department-wide reporting system to track formal sexual harassment complaints and a toll-free advice and counseling line for incidents of sexual harassment.

Admiral Kelso's retirement grade must also be evaluated on his accomplishments during a very distinguished 38 year Naval career.

- After graduating from the Naval Academy, Frank Kelso spent his early career aboard nuclear powered submarines, ultimately commanding Submarine Squadron Seven. Later he served within the Naval Military Personnel Command, and was the Trident Program Coordinator.
- He was the Commander of the Sixth Fleet in October 1985, when the cruise ship Achille Lauro was hijacked by four Palestinian terrorists who murdered an American tourist and threw his body overboard. Ten days later, the President approved a plan to intercept the charter jetliner carrying the terrorists out of Egypt, and authorized Admiral Kelso to execute the plan. Four F-14's from the carrier USS Saratoga intercepted the jetliner and forced it to land in Sicily where the hijackers were arrested.
- Admiral Kelso planned and executed joint air strikes against Libyan boats and radar sites in March 1986 in response to Libyan terrorist bombings.
- During his tour as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, the Navy opened Combat Logistics Force ships to women for the first time, and under Admiral Kelso's leadership, the Atlantic Fleet developed and put in place an extremely successful training program which prepared both the ship and the new crew members for the change. As CNO, Admiral Kelso was the first to recommend to the Secretary of Defense that laws barring women from serving aboard combatant ships be repealed, and supported repeal of the law barring women from combat aviation squadrons.
- In 1990, he became the service's 24th Chief of Naval Operations. Barely two months into the job, he was called upon and provided ready, trained sailors and officers aboard hundreds of ships, submarines and aircraft to support Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

- That experience confirmed for Admiral Kelso a belief that the world had changed, and naval warfare priorities must change with it. As a result of his initiative, the Navy developed a totally new strategy to deal with regional rather than global threats, littoral warfare rather than open-ocean blue-water operations, and joint rather than independent combat actions.
- Also as CNO, he has fought for and won additional funding for improved quality of life programs including family and bachelor housing, Morale, Welfare and Recreation facilities and medical care.

In October 1993, as the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, I was asked by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to review the files prepared by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense that pertained to Admiral Kelso. I took the time to read the complete file.

My conclusion -- then as it is now -- was that Admiral Kelso's veracity was supported by the full reading of the files.

This decision was recently reinforced by a Memorandum from the Acting Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Derek Vander Schaaf. Let me quote directly from his February 1994 memo:

"During our investigation we were unable to find any credible evidence that Admiral Kelso had specific knowledge of the improper incidents and events that took place. We reached that conclusion based on numerous witness interviews. We found individuals who believed they saw Admiral Kelso on the third floor during that infamous Saturday night. However, based on all the testimony, we believe that he was not present on Saturday and that those who believed they saw him are mistaken. We continue to believe that Admiral Kelso had no specific knowledge of the indecent activity that took place."

Further, the Vander Schaaf report concludes:

"In addition, it should be noted that Admiral Kelso's conduct during our investigation was beyond reproach. He offered his assistance in making himself and other senior witnesses available and ensured that the Navy provided "logistical" support and related assistance. Additionally, we found no evidence either testimonial or documentary that Admiral Kelso sought to thwart the Navy's internal investigation of the Tailhook matter. In short, his conduct was certainly not what one would expect from a person in authority who had a lot to lose from a thorough public airing of the facts."

I am aware that a military court has come to a different conclusion. In response, I offer these points. First, Admiral Kelso was not a party to the legal proceeding that produced that judgment. He did not have the opportunity to call other senior leaders of the Navy who were present at the convention, or cross examine witnesses who offered testimony different from his.

Since he was not a party, the findings of the military judge were not intended as a judicial conclusion on any culpability at the Tailhook '91 convention.

Admiral Kelso could have chosen an additional judicial forum to resolve conflicts between the military judge and the Inspector General's conclusions. He chose rather to spare the Navy yet another drawn-out hearing with attendant costs and distractions. He chose to let the Navy focus on the real issue -- eliminating sexual harassment and assuring opportunity to military women in the Navy. I believe his choice is an honorable one, symbolic of this honorable officer's proud career.

On that basis, I believe Admiral Kelso is a man of personal integrity, who has served thirty-eight years with loyalty to the men and women of the United States Navy, his Commanders-In-Chief, and the American people. I urge this committee to approve his retirement at the rank of Admiral.

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
INTERVIEW WITH CHARLES GIBSON ON ABC-TV PROGRAM, "GOOD MORNING AMERICA"
WASHINGTON, D.C.
APRIL 13, 1994

CHARLES GIBSON: We mentioned a few of the trouble spots of the world a few moments ago. They get run down on the news each morning. At the moment, of course, the emphasis is on Bosnia. The Defense Secretary heads to Korea later this week, but he is joining us this morning here in Washington -- Defense Secretary William Perry, and it's good to have you with us, Mr. Secretary.

SEC. PERRY: Thank you, Charlie.

MR. GIBSON: Let me start with Bosnia. President Clinton said the bombing was a clear call to the Serbs to pull back from Gorade. What if they don't?

SEC. PERRY: The first thing we have to consider, Charlie, is that this is a U.N. operation, not a U.S. operation, and the U.N. is in there not to fight a war, not to enter the war on one side or the other, but to perform a peacekeeping operation.

They took their action as part of the peacekeeping operation, not as part of a war.

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MR. GIBSON: But that really begs the question of what the purpose of the bombing was, what the goal now is.

SEC. PERRY: The goal of the bombing was to prevent Serbs from shelling Gorazde, where there were U.N. forces stationed. And to this point, it has succeeded, but it's too early to make judgment on what the final outcome will be.

MR. GIBSON: But things are quiet there now. However, the town is still encircled, it is still in danger from the Serbs, and the question is if there are further moves by the Serbs, we either have to -- we the U.N. and the U.S. -- either have to escalate or pull back.

SEC. PERRY: If the -- my hope, my expectation is that after a pause for a few days here, which seems to be going on right now, that the Serbs and the Bosnians will come back to the negotiating table, which is where they were last Friday. They were in the process of negotiating a cessation of hostilities. That is our objective, that's the U.N. objective to see that cessation negotiated. We have to wait for a day or two to see what the Serbs' next action is. If they start the shelling again, it is very likely that the United Nations will call for more air strikes and NATO will deliver those air strikes. We hope and we believe that's not going to happen.

MR. GIBSON: Well, there are obstacles to getting them back to the table, but I guess I'm really asking do the Serbs have to go back to their positions before the Gorazde shelling began?

SEC. PERRY: They were at the negotiating table last week in the positions they are now. They could begin negotiating again from those positions. It's certainly desirable that two major events happen -- first of all that they stop shelling, secondly that they pull back. It's also desirable to get more U.N. peacekeeping forces in Gorazde. All of those are objectives of the U.N. at this point.

MR. GIBSON: But the Muslims have said, of course, they won't go back to negotiating unless the Serbs withdraw to their positions at the end of March.

SEC. PERRY: I don't think we should draw final conclusions from the statements being made by each of the sides now in the heat of the emotions.

MR. GIBSON: But are we willing to use -- we the U.N. and the U.S. -- willing to use what force is necessary to keep them from taking Gorazde?

SEC. PERRY: The U.N. has proclaimed that Gorazde is a safe haven. They have put U.N. forces in there. The fact that the U.N. forces are there means that if the Serbs attack, the U.N. can invoke close air support to protect the U.N. forces. That's what they did the other day, Sunday and Monday, and if the shelling begins again, that's what they'll do again I believe.

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MR. GIBSON: The Russians have now said that they may delay or perhaps not join the partnership for peace -- or at least the prospective time --

SEC. PERRY: Mm-hmm (acknowledgement).

MR. GIBSON: -- of joining at the end of April may be delayed because of the action that was taken in Gorazde and the fact that they were not consulted. Are they backing off, do you suspect, in the partnership for peace?

SEC. PERRY: I can't tell that yet. They were supposed to be joining it toward the end of this month. I think the timing of their joining is not so important as the fact of joining. Whether it's this month or next month is not a critical issue.

MR. GIBSON: Should they have been consulted?

SEC. PERRY: Consulted in the sense of determining or checking whether the U.N. should call for this strike, I believe no. Russia was consulted in a very important way in that they were part and they agreed to the resolution which allowed for the U.N. to call the strikes, just as the United States did. And so the United Nations responsibility at that point was simply to invoke the action when it happened.

You cannot have consultation in the middle of a close air support operation.

MR. GIBSON: But how big do you consider this problem now, with the Russians obviously disgruntled about what happened?

SEC. PERRY: I believe we can work with the problem with the Russians. I believe the United Nations can work with the problem with the Russians.

MR. GIBSON: What's the biggest national security problem that this country has right now? Is it Korea?

SEC. PERRY: The most immediate problem is Korea. Over the long term, the greatest problem, potential problem, is with Russia. If the reform movement should fail in Russia, if democracy should fail in Russia, this would be a great catastrophe not only for Russia but for the whole world and for United States security.

MR. GIBSON: You say short term Korea is a problem. Is it short term? How soon do we have to have a look at those plants? How soon do we have to have satisfaction that there is not full-scale production going on?

SEC. PERRY: We are working with the North Koreans now in a diplomatic vein, and we will continue to work diplomatically as long

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is there's any hope, and in terms of how soon the plants become a problem, it depends on what their next action is. The next important event is removing the plutonium from the plants. If they move that -- and that could happen several months from now -- but if they move that without United Nations control, that is a serious problem. If they remove it with United Nations control, that's okay.

MR. GIBSON: How serious a problem?

SEC. PERRY: Well, it's serious in the sense that they could take that plutonium and build more bombs with it. We don't know for sure that that's what they would do or the schedule with which they would do it, but there's a possibility for them at that point.

MR. GIBSON: Mr. Secretary, have a good trip.

SEC. PERRY: Thank you.

MR. GIBSON: Nice to have you here.

SEC. PERRY: Nice to talk to you, Charlie.

MR. GIBSON: We appreciate your being with us this morning.

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PRESS ADVISORY

No. 079-P
April 13, 1994

On April 14, 1994, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry will welcome Secretary of State for Defense, the Honorable Malcolm Rifkind of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Pentagon with an Armed Forces Full Honor Arrival ceremony. The event is scheduled to occur at 10:00 a.m. (ET), at the Pentagon River Entrance Parade Field. A photo opportunity in the office of the Secretary of Defense will immediately follow the arrival.

Media interested in audiovisual coverage of this event may contact Jim Kout or Bob Ward at (703) 695-0168.

NEWS BRIEFING

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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry
Minister of Defense Malcolm Rifkind, UK
General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, JCS
Ms. Kathleen M. deLaski, ATSD (PA)
Thursday, April 14, 1994

Ms. deLaski: Thank you for coming today.

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili have agreed to come down and give you what they know so far. I will stress that this part of our briefing will be very short because we don't know very much yet. We don't have a lot of the facts. We don't have a lot more than the White House was able to give you.

We also have Minister of Defense Malcolm Rifkind here from Britain. He was here for meetings, and will also say a few words to you.

With that, I turn it over to Dr. Perry.

Secretary Perry: On behalf of the Department of Defense, I would like to extend my deepest sympathies to the families of those who were killed in the tragic incident in Iraq today. These people lost their lives while conducting an international effort to protect the people of Iraq. They died on a mission in support of a noble cause of protecting an oppressed people, namely the Kurdish minority in Iraq.

The circumstances surrounding this incident add to the tragedy, and I want to express my regrets and pledge that this incident will be fully investigated.

Preliminary reports are always very sketchy, but let me lay out what happened as we know it so far.

At about 3:30 in the morning, Eastern Daylight Time, two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters assigned to the Provide Comfort Combined Task Force, approximately 35 miles north of Irbil in Iraq, were shot down by two U.S. Air Force F-15C aircraft, also assigned to the Task Force.

Apparently the U.S. helicopters were mistakenly identified as Iraqi Hind helicopters operating in the northern no-fly exclusion zone, north of the 36th Parallel. U.S. search and rescue teams have been deployed to the site.

Finally, let me say that the U.S. contribution to Provide Comfort efforts is ultimately under my supervision. Therefore, I take full responsibility for today's tragedy, and I pledge that I will take a direct role in ensuring that the investigation is conducted as thoroughly and as quickly as possible.

Let me ask General Shalikashvili to make additional comments.

General Shalikashvili: Let me begin by expressing my deepest sorrow and regret over the tragic incident that occurred this morning. And let me assure you that, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I feel a sense of personal responsibility for this tragedy, and the loss of so many lives.

As Secretary Perry pointed out, those were the individuals who were on such a noble mission -- to protect the people of northern Iraq.

I am most concerned right now for the families and loved ones of those who were killed. It is most important that we look after their families and help them through this grief.

As the President noted earlier, an investigation is being appointed to look into the events that led to this tragic loss. But we still have only a preliminary understanding of what occurred, and until we have a thorough understanding of what happened, I will not speculate any further.

My real purpose for being here is to pass on my sympathy and deep sorrow to the families and the governments of those who lost their lives here this morning.

Thank you very much.

Secretary Perry: As Kathleen indicated, we also have the Minister of Defense of the United Kingdom, Malcolm Rifkind who was here for a meeting today. We believe that two UN officers who were in that aircraft were British officers. So, I've invited Malcolm to come and join us and to say a few words to you as well.

Minister Rifkind: I'd like to associate myself with what Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili have just been saying. Clearly, we also convey our deepest sympathies and condolences to the families of those who have been bereaved.

As Secretary Perry has remarked, it is likely that two British officers lost their lives, as well as officers of a number of other nationalities. I wish to pass on my own personal condolences to the families of those two officers. Clearly, it was a matter of great tragedy, great sympathy that is now extended to them.

We have, of course, complete confidence in the inquiries that the United States authorities will be carrying out as to the cause of this incident, and it's not appropriate to comment on, or speculate on the circumstances until these inquiries have been carried out. We know that these brave people have lost their lives carrying out their duty in a very difficult situation, and I believe it is appropriate that we should all, therefore, wish to pay tribute to them.

Thank you very much.

Q: Mr. Secretary, might we ask you just a few questions?

Secretary Perry: You may ask. I'm probably limited in what I can answer you at this stage. I will say, we will schedule press conferences, at least one, maybe two, later on this afternoon. As we get information we will pass it on to you. I just don't want to speculate and guess at numbers when we don't know them at this point.

Q: You said that the helicopters you believe were identified as Hinds. Who identified them, how were the helicopters shot down? Were they shot down with missiles? Were the U.S. jets in visual contact with these helicopters and being directed by an AWACS?

Secretary Perry: The reports we have to-date are that the Hinds were shot down by missiles fired by the F-15s. There was an AWACS in the area and it was overseeing the operation.

Q: Who identified these helicopters as Hinds? And were the jets that shot down the helicopters in visual contact with the helicopters?

Secretary Perry: Yes.

Q: They were. So, the jets themselves misidentified them as Hinds?

Secretary Perry: I don't want to come to conclusions yet about the full details of the misidentification, but it is factually correct that this was daylight weather and that the pilots did go in to make a visual identification.

Q: Mr. Secretary, not to ask you to speculate while your investigation is going, but two points. As a matter of procedure, when a shoot-down of this type is authorized, does the AWACS...is that the final authority that makes the call? Or is

this a decision that has to go back to a higher headquarters in Incirlik? Who makes the decision to authorize the shoot-down?

The second question is, who was on these helicopters? I'm not asking you to identify the specific individuals, but what was their mission and what was their rank. Were these high ranking officers on a diplomatic mission? What was the purpose of the helicopter operation?

Secretary Perry: I'll comment on the second one and ask General Shalikashvili to comment on the rules of engagement in that area.

This was a UN mission. It involved UN officers of several different nationalities. We know for sure American and British. They were there as part of the relief mission for the Kurds. They were on a mission to go to a Kurd village, meet with some of the elders in that village. We don't know the names of the people. We don't have a breakout yet, but we know for sure there were at least two nationalities, probably more. They would be, in the case of the officers involved, based on the mission that's going on over there, they would very likely be field grade officers.

Q: They were all military officers?

Secretary Perry: We don't know that for sure. There may have been some civilians as well.

General Shalikashvili: On the issue of the rules of engagement, I would tell you that this is an ongoing mission, and so we should be very careful about speaking about rules of engagement, or the specifics of it because by doing so we will only endanger the lives of those who will continue flying these missions.

However, the rules of engagement are such that the decision, after proper identification, is made on the scene and not back in Incirlik. So, there was no violation in that part of the procedure. Clearly, something went wrong, and an investigation will have to determine exactly what did go wrong.

Q: Can you give us a sense of what is the threat in the region? The overarching reason for taking such a violent response to two helicopters. Have there been threats from Iraqi helicopters against the Kurds recently? Can you put it in some perspective?

General Shalikashvili: The no-fly zone was established under the rubric of a United Nations Security Council Resolution, I believe 688, back in the April '91 timeframe when Saddam Hussein's forces chased hundreds of thousands of Kurds into the mountains of northern Iraq, and eastern Turkey. It is under that United Nations Security Council resolution, whose purpose it is to provide protection to the

citizens of northern Iraq, that a no-fly zone was established shortly thereafter and has been in effect since the spring or summer of '91.

The purpose is to ensure that no Iraqi aircraft would fly north of the 32nd parallel, and therefore, be denied the opportunity to harass or otherwise intimidate the citizens of northern Iraq, principally the Kurds.

Q: Do the helicopters routinely have friend and foe identification capability? Are the Air Force jets patrolling the area required to try to squawk them, to communicate with aircraft?

General Shalikashvili: The helicopters do routinely have identification friend or foe, and the procedures, again, I don't want to go into too much detail. But, it is my judgment that if procedures were followed, they in fact, would be squawking.

Q: I was asking if it was necessary when any operations are carried out north of the 36th Parallel, if it is necessary for those undertaking these flights to file flight plans so it is known whether these are friends or foes in that area.

General Shalikashvili: I will have to leave to European Command to talk to the specific procedures, how they ensure that the information that's exchanged between the AWACS aircraft, the fighter aircraft, and those other airplanes or helicopters as were involved at this time.

The procedures are there, designed to prevent an incident like this. Whether that's done in the sense of a flight plan as you know it or if there's some other coordination activity, we will need to refer that to European Command.

Q: Did both jets fire missiles?

General Shalikashvili: It is my understanding and has... It has been reported to me that both jets fired a missile.

(END)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
 INTERVIEW WITH JAMIE MCINTYRE ON CNN-TV PROGRAM, "THE WORLD TODAY,"
 FOLLOWING BRIEFING REGARDING SHOOT-DOWN OF HELICOPTERS OVER IRAQ
 BY FRIENDLY FIRE
 PENTAGON
 APRIL 14, 1994

FRANK SESNO: In Northern Iraq, the U.S. military says, 26 people died today when two American helicopters were shot down by U.S. fighter jets.

A little while ago, as a mark of respect for those who lost their lives, President Clinton ordered flags flown at half-staff at all public buildings, as well as on military facilities and vessels. This is the flag, as you can see, flying a short time ago at the White House.

For more on the official investigation into the shooting incident, we're joined by CNN military affairs correspondent Jamie McIntyre at the Pentagon.

Jamie?

JAMIE MCINTYRE: Frank, the U.S. military is trying to figure out how, despite dozens of safeguards, two of its planes shot down two of its own helicopters, in what has turned out to be a tragic case of mistaken identity.

In the light of day but under the heat of combat air patrol, U.S. pilots mistook American Army Black Hawk helicopters, like these, for Iraqi helicopters, Soviet-built Hinds, like these, which appeared to be violating the northern no-fly zone set up three years ago to protect Kurds from Saddam Hussein. The friendly fire fiasco cost 26 lives, including 15 Americans.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: We should join together in terrible sorrow, and also in honoring the high purpose for which these individuals serve and in which they lost their lives.

MCINTYRE: Defense Secretary William Perry says he's taken a number of actions to insure there's no repeat of the tragedy.

SECRETARY PERRY: First of all, I have directed our Commander-in-Chief in Europe, General Joulwan, to immediately

undertake a full-scale investigation. He has already appointed an investigative board.

Sources say the Army Black Hawk helicopters had rehearsed the flight ahead of time and were in contact with an AWACS surveillance plane. The U.S. F-15s saw the helicopters while on routine patrol, relayed the sighting to the AWACS, and then, sources say, made at least two low overflights to identify them. The AWACS then cleared the F-15s to fire air-to-air missiles after the pilots were convinced, mistakenly, they were targeting Iraqi Hind helicopters violating the no-fly zone.

Sources say the F-15s each fired one air-to-air missile, one firing an AMRAM radar-guided missile, the other a Sidewinder heat-seeking missile.

The Black Hawk helicopters are equipped with IFF transponders, devices that are supposed to automatically identify the aircraft as friend, not foe, if hit with a radio signal, called squawking.

LT. GEN. RICHARD KELLER [U.S. Europe Command]: The whole thing has been rehearsed the day ahead of time. The normal squawk procedures are in place. Positive identification by AWACS is required. And so on. And it's rehearsed and briefed the day before. And then as we go out and do these operations, it's executed that way.

Where those procedures failed in this case, we're not sure yet.

MCINTYRE: Secretary Perry says he's certain that not just a single mistake led to the accident, that it was a combination of human error and also some procedural problems.

One former fighter pilot put it more bluntly, calling it a command-and-control screw-up of the first order.

Jamie McIntyre, CNN, the Pentagon.

SESNO: So a lot of questions remain, Jamie.

How is the Pentagon going to go about trying to answer them here, methodically?

MCINTYRE: Well, they've appointed a special panel to look into it. They've called in experts on F-15s and also Black Hawk helicopters. They'll be reviewing the tapes from

the AWACS transmissions.

But it seems at this point that the problem seems to be that the AWACS controllers -- at least the early indication is that they may have lost track of the U.S. helicopters as they were making stops in Iraq and not realized that they were back in the area where they had planned to be. And because the identification by the U.S. pilot seemed to be so certain that those were Iraqi helicopters, the idea that there could have been the U.S. helicopters in the same area just didn't occur to them.

SESNO: And what more can you tell us, if anything, about the casualties and the search for them, the effort to recover the bodies, where they're from?

MCINTYRE: Well, all the bodies have been recovered. There are 26 bodies from, 15 Americans plus Turkish, British, French, and even five Kurds who were on that mission. Those bodies will be flown out of Iraq today. And the U.S. casualty, the U.S. bodies will be brought back to Dover, Delaware, where Secretary of Defense William Perry says he plans to go personally to meet them. He says he takes full responsibility for what happened today.

SESNO: Jamie McIntyre, at the Pentagon, thanks very much.

Well, later in our expanded coverage here on this broadcast, we will have more of correspondent McIntyre's interview with the U.S. Defense Secretary, William Perry, on today's incident in Northern Iraq.

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JUDY WOODRUFF: Our expanded coverage focuses on today's downing of two U.S. helicopters in Northern Iraq by fellow American aircraft. Two F-15 fighter jets patrolling a no-fly zone in the region apparently mistook the Black Hawk choppers for Iraqi aircraft. The Pentagon says that all 26 people aboard the two helicopters died in the incident, including 15 Americans.

In the past hour, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry spoke about the shooting with CNN military affairs correspondent Jamie McIntyre.

MCINTYRE: We're here in the Pentagon briefing room with Defense Secretary

William Perry, in the wake of the tragic mishap in the skies over Iraq in which two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters were brought down by friendly fire.

Mr. Secretary, this has got to be a bitter pill to take.

SECRETARY PERRY: It's a tragedy for the families involved and it's a great tragedy for us at the Pentagon, as well. We are family here, and all of our family feel this loss very deeply.

What went wrong?

SECRETARY PERRY: Well, I can speculate on that at this time, but the speculation would be just that.

What I really want to tell you, instead of what I'm speculating, is what we are doing to find out the answer to that question.

I am -- all of these forces are under my guidance, and I am accountable to the President, to the Congress and to the public for this accident and for the follow-up to this accident, to be sure that we get a full understanding of what happened and take what actions we need to do to correct it, so that something like this cannot happen again. And I've taken a number of actions already to that end.

First of all, I have directed our Commander-in-Chief in Europe, General Joulwan, to immediately undertake a full-scale investigation. He has already appointed an investigative board. Major General Andrus, the Commander of the Third Air Force, will be the president of that board. We will have on that board senior Army aviators, people who are very familiar with F-15s and AWACS. We have invited representatives on the board from other nations who were in the accident, the French, the British and the Turks.

MCINTYRE: What's the major focus of the investigation at this point? This was something that took place in daylight and was an operation that was rehearsed the day before, we're told. Clearly, it shouldn't have happened.

Where are you looking at? What's the most likely area of concern?

SECRETARY PERRY: It seems to me, Jamie, to be clear that there were several accidents -- several errors that took place. There

must have been human errors, and there most also have been some fault in the process. I don't think we will find a single error for an accident of this magnitude. And therefore the purpose of the investigation is to get to the bottom, get the full facts on that so we can determine once and for all what caused it. We want a full accountability of what happened here.

MCINTYRE: In the meantime, how will this affect the enforcement of the no-fly zones in Iraq? Are you ordering any of the aircraft to be grounded?

SECRETARY PERRY: No. What I have done is I have requested General Shalikashvili to begin immediately a very high-priority review of the procedures we're using in the three areas of the world where we now have no-fly zones being enforced. And this full-scale review will be looking at the process we use, the systems we use, to try to determine weaknesses, to try to determine areas where, if we changed the procedures, changed the process, we will reduce the likelihood.

I want to point out we have been conducting these no-fly zones in this particular area alone more than two years. We've never had this problem in the past. But it's clear there's some error in the system, some fault in the system. And between these two moves -- first of all, the investigative board to determine specifically what happened on this accident; and then, secondly, the General Shalikashvili's review to review our processes in all of the areas where we conduct the no-fly -- we intend to get to the bottom of this.

MCINTYRE: This incident, now, some have suggested that it's evidence that the United States, in all the military operations it's involved in, is simply stretched too thin. Is that the case?

SECRETARY PERRY: No. I think there's no indication of that in this.

And I want to say again that we still have weeks ahead of us before we find out fully what happened. But all of the evidence we have said that these planes were in fine operating order and that the pilots were well-trained and well-skilled.

So, something happened here. We don't

know yet, but there's no indication that there's any systematic weakness in the training or in the adequacy of our airplanes.

MCINTYRE: Why was it that it seemed so important to take down those helicopters, assuming they had been Iraqi helicopters, when there hasn't been much of a threat from Iraqi helicopters in the past?

SECRETARY PERRY: There has been, over the last few years, numerous testing by the Iraqis of this no-fly zone, both in the northern and in the southern region, sometimes by fixed-wing aircraft, sometimes by helicopters. And we have procedures, we have operating rules over there which require vigorous prosecution of that no-fly zone.

MCINTYRE: You're scheduled to leave on a trip to Korea. Will this affect your plans?

SECRETARY PERRY: Yes. I was planning to leave tomorrow. I'm going to delay that for a few days. First of all, I want to be sure that these investigative boards get adequately launched, that this review procedure that General Shalikashvili is going to be conducting is something we need to do in a few days, so that we can change our procedures as quickly as possible, to the extent we believe that's necessary; and also, we have many responsibilities to the families of the people who were killed in that. And I want personally to oversee the -- to ensure that we get full support to those families.

MCINTYRE: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for being with us.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
INTERVIEW WITH JIM LEHRER ON PBS-TV PROGRAM, "THE MACNEIL/LEHRER
NEWSHOUR" REGARDING SHOOT-DOWN OF U.S. HELICOPTERS BY FRIENDLY FIRE
FOLLOWING BRIEFING AT PENTAGON
PENTAGON
APRIL 14, 1994

JIM LEHRER: We go first tonight to the Washington explanations of what happened to those two U.S. helicopters in Iraq and why.

Kwame Holman reports.

KWAME HOLMAN: Some early reports had implicated the Iraqis in the shootdown. But shortly after 11:00 this morning, a somber-sounding President Clinton confirmed that missiles from two U.S. F-15 fighters had destroyed the American helicopters carrying the U.N. officials.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: According to initial reports, two American helicopters were mistakenly identified as Iraqi helicopters and shot down by United States aircraft.

I have met with Secretary Perry this morning. I have talked with him and with General Shalikashvili. And I have instructed him to lead a full inquiry into the circumstances of this terrible incident. We will get the facts.

We should join together in terrible sorrow, and also in honoring the high purpose for which these individuals served and in which they lost their lives. The nation and the world should remember them in gratitude.

Thank you.

HOLMAN: Minutes after the President spoke, Defense Secretary William Perry gave the first details of what happened.

SECRETARY PERRY: At about 3:30 in the morning, Eastern Daylight Time, two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters assigned to the Provide Comfort combined task force, approximately 35 miles north of Irbil in Iraq, were shot down by two U.S. Air Force F-15C aircraft, also assigned to the task force.

Apparently, the U.S. helicopters were mistakenly identified as Iraqi Hind helicopters operating in the northern no-fly exclusion zone north of the 36th Parallel.

U.S. search and rescue teams have been deployed to the site.

Finally, let me say that the U.S. contribution to Provide Comfort efforts is ultimately under my supervision. Therefore I take full responsibility for today's tragedy. And I pledge that I will take a direct role in insuring that the investigation is conducted as thoroughly, as quickly as possible.

Let me ask General Shalikashvili to make additional comments.

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: Let me begin by expressing my deepest sorrow and regret over the tragic incident that occurred this morning. And let me assure you that, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I feel a sense of personal responsibility for this tragedy and the loss of so many lives.

As Secretary Perry pointed out, those were the individuals who were on such a noble mission, to protect the people of Northern Iraq.

HOLMAN: Central to the incident was how a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter, like this one, could be mistaken for a Hind helicopter used by the Iraqis.

REPORTER: Were the jets that shot down the helicopters in visual contact with the helicopters?

SECRETARY PERRY: Yes.

REPORTER: They were.

So the jets themselves misidentified them as Hinds.

SECRETARY PERRY: I don't want to come to conclusions yet about the full details of the misidentification. But it is factually correct that this was daylight weather and that the pilots did go in to make a visual identification.

REPORTER: Do helicopters routinely have friend-and-foe identification capability? Are the Air Force jets patrolling the area required to try to squawk them, to communicate with aircraft?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: The helicopters do routinely have identification friend-or-foe. And the procedures -- again, I don't wish to go into too much detail. But it is my judgment, if procedures were followed, they in fact would be squawking.

HOLMAN: The people killed today were part of a United Nations mission that has provided aid to the Kurdish minority, who have fought against Saddam Hussein's government since the end of the Gulf War.

This afternoon the U.S. commander in charge of the no-fly operations confirmed by phone to reporters at the Pentagon that no one aboard the helicopters survived.

LT. GEN. RICHARD KELLER [Chief of Staff, European Command]: They had 26 air crew and passengers embarked. We have no reports of survivors. This total includes 15 U.S. personnel, three Turkish officers, one French officer, two British officers and five Kurdish passengers.

At approximately 7:35, 0735, Greenwich Mean Time, two F-15C aircraft visually identified what they thought were two Iraqi Hind helicopters. One F-15C aircraft fired one AIM-120 AMRAM missile, and the other F-15 aircraft fired one AIM-9 Sidewinder missile, downing the two UH-60 helicopters.

At the time of the incident, a U.S. Air Force AWACS airborne early-warning aircraft was airborne and monitoring airspace north of the 36th Parallel.

The whole thing has been rehearsed the day ahead of time. The normal squawk procedures are in place. Positive identification by AWACS is required. And so on.

Where those procedures failed in this case, we're not sure yet.

HOLMAN: General Keller said once next of kin are notified, the names of the dead will be released.

LEHRER: And then, as short while ago, I interviewed Secretary Perry from the Pentagon.

Mr. Secretary, welcome.

SECRETARY PERRY: Thank you, Jim.

LEHRER: Sir, what is the latest that is known about what went wrong this morning?

SECRETARY PERRY: Well, let me tell you the results, first of all, which are indeed tragic. There were 26 people killed in that accident, 15 Americans, five Kurds, three Turks, two British and one French. It's a total of 26. Their bodies have been recovered. They're being

flown to Turkey, and tomorrow morning we will fly them to Frankfurt. And then, eventually, the Americans will be flown back to the United States.

LEHRER: The investigation, I assume, has not turned up -- what has the investigation turned up, exactly, as to what caused those two American jets to destroy these two American helicopters?

SECRETARY PERRY: Jim, at this stage I would just be speculating if I would try to guess what happened there. But I can assure you that, as the Secretary, I feel the full responsibility for this action and that I will be accountable for following up on it to be sure that the proper -- first of all, full disclosure is made to the President, to the Congress and the public, and that we take the proper actions to correct any errors we discover in it.

LEHRER: Have the two pilots, the jet pilots, been interviewed?

SECRETARY PERRY: Yes, they have been interviewed. But the investigative board is just appointed. I have directed the Commander-in-Chief of our forces in Europe, General Joulwan, to convene an investigative board. He has done that. The president of that board is going to be Major General Andrus, who's the Commander of the Third Air Force in Europe. There are going to be on that board Army aviation experts, F-15 experts, AWACS experts. We've also invited representatives from the other countries that were involved, Turkey, France and the United Kingdom.

LEHRER: Did these two pilots -- were they convinced that these were Iraqi helicopters rather than American helicopters?

SECRETARY PERRY: Yes, they were. They, both during the time of the incident and in their post-action report, they reported a positive identification of Hind helicopters. Evidently, they were wrong.

One of the things I'm doing besides appointing this investigative board is I've requested General Shalikashvili to immediately review the procedures that we're using, not just in the Northern Iraq no-fly zone, but in the three areas in the world where we're now conducting

no-fly operations. That's in Northern Iraq, Southern Iraq and Bosnia. So that we have a complete -- so that I get, with him, in a matter of a few days detailed recommendations on how we might want to revise our procedures.

LEHRER: The procedures that exist now, Mr. Secretary, allow pilots on their own to make this kind of determination and then just take action and shoot down two unarmed helicopters, whether they're Iraqi or whatever?

SECRETARY PERRY: Jim, first of all, I can't comment, I can't describe the operating rules of engagement we have for these operations. I can tell you, though, that they're different in Bosnia from the ones that we're using in Iraq. And they are going to be -- all three of them are going to be reevaluated.

But I also can say that, just on the basis of what has happened, even in a preliminary examination of what has happened, it is clear that there were some serious errors made.

What we have to do in the investigation is to distinguish between human errors and process or procedural errors. There may have been some of both. And we want to get to the bottom of all of it.

LEHRER: Have you -- is anything being done, any procedures being stopped, any operations being stopped while this thing is being investigated, to make sure that something like this doesn't happen somewhere else, or even right there again in Iraq tomorrow?

SECRETARY PERRY: Yes. I've asked General Shalikashvili to make a modification in our procedure, in the case of the Iraq no-fly zone, that would minimize the risk of something like this happening again. That is pending the review that he's making, where we should have a complete revision, or a complete consideration of revision in just a few days.

LEHRER: The way the procedure worked this morning, and until this tragedy occurred, as I say, to come back to my question earlier, those pilots who were flying those jets, did they make the decision all by themselves to go ahead and shoot at those two helicopters?

SECRETARY PERRY: Jim, in the operation, there were two pilots there but there

was also an AWACS. And the AWACS and the pilots were in communication at the time of this mission. Beyond that, I can't give you specifics about the detailed event-by-event occurrence.

We have tapes of the conversations, we have detailed records, which we're now studying. And within a day or two we will have a very complete picture.

LEHRER: Within a day or two you will know what happened?

SECRETARY PERRY: Within a day or two we will know -- we will have a sequential picture of the events. We can answer the kind of question you just asked. That is a long way, though, Jim, from being able to determine the full cause of the error and whether there were systematic or human errors, or both.

LEHRER: Mr. Secretary there was a report a few months ago that you have canceled your trip to Asia, to Japan and Korea, because of that. Is this correct?

SECRETARY PERRY: No, that's not quite correct, Jim. I have postponed it for a few days. The Korea trip is very, very important to me and I plan to go through with that trip. But I have several things that have come up, this being one of them, which mean that it just made it impossible for me to leave tomorrow, which is when I had planned to.

I have to be absolutely sure that we get these investigations launched, that we get the procedures that I've talked about reconsidered very quickly, and that we have a whole set of actions we need to take to ensure that the families receive adequate assistance. All of those things I have to do in the next few days. And as a consequence, I've postponed my trip to sometime next week.

LEHRER: All right.

Mr. Secretary, thank you.

SECRETARY PERRY: Thank you, Jim.



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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 15, 1994

FACT SHEET

DOD'S HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS REVIEW

In response to the President's guidance of late December 1993, the Secretary of Defense charged the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) Dr. Harold P. Smith to lead DoD's efforts to discover the nature and extent of the Department's involvement in human radiation experimentation. In early January 1994, Dr. Smith organized a DoD Steering Committee of top-level DoD officials to oversee the unprecedented records search and review.

In January 1994, Dr. Smith issued a memorandum to the individual Services and all other DoD components providing detailed guidance on locating, identifying, reviewing, and declassifying records pertaining to human radiation experiments. This guidance instructed DoD components to preserve existing records; manage records in accordance with Freedom of Information Act, Privacy Act and security classification procedures. The memorandum directed that records be declassified to the maximum extent. Further, if a question arose on a particular experiment, DoD components were directed to err on the side of inclusion in the initial identification of a possible experiment.

To ensure the quality, comprehensiveness and integrity of the search process, DoD components were directed to submit a report consisting of two parts. In Part I, each agency was required to identify each subordinate organization that may have conducted or sponsored experiments; records storage locations; a description of the efforts undertaken to confirm if records were at the locations identified; and to report if records had been found. Part II of the report required each organization to describe each experiment identified in the search.

(OVER)

A massive records search was conducted involving hundreds of DoD subordinate agencies, organizations and departments and millions of records. To coordinate this massive search and retrieval effort, the Department established a Radiation Experiments Command Center (RECC). The RECC developed two high-speed automated databases to organize and control the information being gathered. One database is designed to monitor inquiries from the public, other Federal agencies and Congress, and to analyze information received from these and other sources. A second database is designed to compile and organize information on possible experiments identified during the records search. The development of these innovative systems will allow reviewers to quickly cross-reference and match files from the two databases and significantly enhance the Department's ability to respond to inquiries from the Independent Advisory Committee, Congress and the public.

The Department's search has thus far identified approximately 1,749 DoD conducted or supported activities from 1944 to the present that may fall within the scope of the Interagency Working Group definition of human radiation experiments. However, it appears that the overwhelming majority of those cases are clinical research activities conducted by DoD medical components since 1974 involving therapeutic investigations in which radiation was used solely in accordance with established, non-experimental diagnostic procedures.

Secretary of Defense William Perry remains committed to a thorough and complete search of all available records and the full public release of the pertinent information in those records. All retrieved information will be turned over to the Independent Advisory Committee for further review.

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PRESS ADVISORY

No. 083-P

April 15, 1994

Secretary of Defense William Perry and General John Shalikasvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will conduct a briefing today, April 15, 1994, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT). in the Pentagon Briefing Studio, room 2E781. They will discuss matters related to the accidental shootdown of two U.S. helicopters on April 14, 1994, in northern Iraq.

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NEWS BRIEFING

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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry
General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, JCS
Ms. Kathleen M. deLaski, ATSD (PA)
Friday, April 15, 1994

Ms. deLaski: Good afternoon

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili have agreed to come down to the briefing room to give you whatever information they can. As you know, there are two reasons why we don't have a lot of the facts yet. One is that they haven't come in. The second is that there is an investigation, and some of our answers could prejudice the investigation. So, I hope you understand that, and with that in mind, we tried to figure out what we can give you at this point, so, we'll begin from there.

With that, I offer Dr. Perry, who will start off.

Secretary Perry: Thank you, Kathleen.

Let me start off this afternoon by once more expressing our sincerest condolences to the families and friends of those who lost their lives in yesterday's tragedy. Expressions of our sympathy have already been passed to the respective governments of those coalition partners who also lost citizens in this incident.

I would like to announce that the people directly involved in Operation Provide Comfort -- that is those assigned to the Combined Task Force -- will be conducting a memorial service at their headquarters in Incirlik, Turkey, on Sunday, April 17th at 6:00 p.m. local time.

At times such as these we have two main priorities -- providing the necessary support to the families who have lost loved ones, and working as hard and as quickly as possible to get to the bottom of what happened. We want to take the measures necessary to ensure that a tragedy such as this does not occur again.

I thought it might be of some value to you for me to describe some of the support that we provide for the families. I want you to know that there is an officer assigned to each of the families who suffered a loss in this accident who, along with a military chaplain, will help them through this troubled time. But, in addition to

those professionals, there is a vast network of family support. In fact, family support groups have already formed at bases in Germany, where some of those helicopters were assigned. Groups like these are providing both material and emotional support to those who are affected.

I have one other message for the families of those who lost their lives. Your loved ones were serving a noble, humanitarian mission -- one of the largest relief efforts in recent military history.

After the Gulf War, several countries banded together to bring relief to more than a million Kurds who were forced to flee their homes. The job of the U.S. and the coalition forces, and later the UN and private aid groups, was to give them back the lives they had lost through the devastation of war by rebuilding villages, providing food and clothing, and providing protection from the Iraqi military forces.

Many of those who died yesterday were working to support a small military coordination committee in Zahku in northern Iraq. That is really the nerve center of the operation in the north. The Military Coordination Committee, composed of U.S., Turkish, British, and French military personnel, is the eyes-on-the-ground for the aircraft that patrol over northern Iraq, and for the military and political leadership of the coalition nations. They helped organize efforts to rebuild villages destroyed by the war, and to deliver food, remain in contact with local leaders and international relief officials, and were a visible demonstration of the coalition's commitment to the people of northern Iraq. In fact, when our people drive through the villages they are helping to restore, the local populations often line the roads to cheer. So, don't let anyone tell you that this mission was not a critical one.

Operation Provide Comfort's history is distinguished by compassionate caring service and the use of measured force to provide both humanitarian support and essential security safeguards to the more than three million people in northern Iraq who need our help.

As for yesterday's tragedy, I know you all have the same question that I have. How could this have possibly happened? We do not yet have the answer to that question, but I am accountable to the President, to the Congress, to the public, and to the families to get those answers, to determine what errors were made, and to take corrective actions. I will meet that responsibility.

Immediately after the accident I directed our commander-in-chief in Europe, General Joulwan, to appoint an investigative board. He has done so. The president of that board will be Major General Andrus, the commander of the 3rd Air Force, headquartered at RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom. The crash investigating team consists of F-15, AWACS, and other aviation and legal experts. France, United

Kingdom, and Turkey have been invited to appoint associate members to the team. This team arrived at Incirlik a short time ago.

This investigation is intended to determine personal culpability, if any, where the system's failure or inadequacies existed, and where the procedures were adequate, and if not, what revisions are required.

If our procedures need to be changed we will change them, and we will change them immediately. If individuals are found to be culpable, we will discipline them. But we will not rush the judgment. Individuals who are suspected of misconduct will be thoroughly advised of their rights, and those rights will be protected throughout the investigation.

In this investigation, the investigators will be looking at a wide range of things in order to determine exactly what happened. Among the many questions they will attempt to answer are: Were the helicopters in contact with the AWACS? Did the AWACS attempt to contact the helicopters? Were the helicopters' IFF systems working? Did the F-16 ask the AWACS for confirmation before firing? Had the helicopters filed a flight plan, and if yes, were they flying the pre-planned route, or had they deviated from the filed route? Were the AWACS and F-15s aware that two U.S. helicopters were in the area? Did the F-15s attempt to make radio contact with the helicopters, and if not, why not?

These are all very good questions, and we do not have definitive answers to those questions at this time, but we will have, and we will have very shortly. That is what our investigation is all about.

I have pledged to the President and to the Congress that we will get to the bottom of this, that there will be full and timely disclosure of the facts, that I will hold fully accountable anyone who violated the stringent procedures that dictated this operation, and that we will take corrective procedures, as necessary, so this cannot happen again.

Now, I'd like to turn the podium over to General Shalikashvili. He has some information about how the procedures were supposed to work and some information on the Provide Comfort mission.

As you may know, he commanded the Provide Comfort mission during its most active phase. After his comments, both he and I will be available for questions.

General Shalikashvili: Thank you very much.

Let me at the outset join Secretary Perry in expressing my very deep sorrow to the families of the brave men and women who lost their lives in this tragic accident yesterday.

I would like to start out, if I may, by saying a few words by way of amplification on Operation Provide Comfort. As most of you might recall, by the summer of '91, the military part of the humanitarian operation of returning the Kurds from the mountains of northern Iraq and eastern Turkey had been completed. The majority of the military personnel were withdrawn from Iraq, and most of them went home, with the exception of the Military Coordination Committee that Secretary Perry just talked about -- a small group located in Zahku on the border between Iraq and Turkey. Secretary Perry addressed their mission, that remains their mission until today.

The vast majority then of the American and French and British support through Operation Provide Comfort is confined to the mission of providing security over the territory of northern Iraq north of the 36th parallel, where our airplanes, together with coalition airplanes, patrol the sky to ensure that Iraqi aircraft cannot harass, or in any other way, interfere with their citizens living in northern Iraq.

By the way, I must tell you that since that time when we have been flying this no-fly zone, literally over 27,000 fixed wing sorties have been flown, and at the same time, over 1,400 helicopter flights have been conducted in conjunction with the fixed wing sorties that I just mentioned to you. Throughout, the same procedures were used -- the same procedures that essentially were in place yesterday when this tragic accident occurred.

The operations conducted yesterday were not unlike similar operations that have been conducted many times before over these past years. The AWACS aircraft provides overall command and control over aircraft operating north of the 36th parallel. The two fighters, the two F-15s in question, were part of a larger coalition force of 34 fighter aircraft that were cycled in and out over northern Iraq throughout the day. Their mission was, as their mission has been before, to patrol the skies over northern Iraq, to provide a deterrent presence, and to enforce the no-fly zone against any violators.

The Blackhawks, the two Blackhawks involved were carrying, as you now know, 26 coalition members from the Military Coordination Center, and they were on the way to meet selected Kurdish officials when this accident occurred.

There has been some discussion about IFF -- Identification Friend or Foe equipment. I just thought that with this simple chart I might point out that Identification Friend or Foe equipment, it's located on the AWACS and gives the

AWACS the capability with an electronic signal to interrogate, in this particular case, the Blackhawks which then, if the correct codes are set on the equipment, and the equipment is functioning properly, would respond automatically to the AWACS and identify itself as a friend. The same can be done from the F-15 Eagle aircraft. Electronically it can interrogate the Blackhawk and again, if the codes match, the Blackhawks would respond back electronically, identifying itself as friend.

The other point that has been in the press in the last few hours is the issue of the difference between a Hind helicopter and a Blackhawk. I have two charts here. The first one simply shows you a schematic view from the top of a Hind helicopter on top, and a Blackhawk on the bottom. The reason I show you that is because we have often looked at Blackhawk helicopters, but, not when they are carrying external fuel tanks. Here you see the external fuel tank mounted and how that would look from the top. Of course, on the left side of the chart are the specific characteristics, physical characteristics of the two aircraft.

The next chart will show you a photograph both of a Hind and a Blackhawk; the Hind and then the Blackhawk carrying the external fuel tanks.

With that, rather than go on, I think that Secretary Perry and I are prepared to answer any of your questions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, might I ask you, you've described the IFF. Was the IFF transponding, was the transponder working on the helicopters? And if it was, what was the problem? Why couldn't it be read? We understand that you've determined that the IFF was, in fact, working.

General Shalikashvili: I cannot speculate whether the IFF was working at the time that they were in the area of operations. The investigation will have to determine that.

Q: By working, do you mean working properly, or working at all? Was it transponding?

General Shalikashvili: I cannot tell you that. The investigation will have to determine that.

Q: You said, General, that the F-15 could interrogate the IFF, the transponder, if it was working correctly. Would that be the normal practice in a situation like this, assuming those had been Iraqi helicopters as the pilots believed?

General Shalikashvili: That is correct. That would be the situation that the aircraft that is believed to be the hostile aircraft would be interrogated electronically by IFF.

Q: Is it possible that the pilots might not have done that if they were absolutely convinced that they were dealing with an enemy aircraft, and had no thought in their mind that this might be a friendly? Possibly they might have bypassed that step?

General Shalikashvili: That would not be the procedure, and I cannot speculate whether they did so or not.

Q: The question of the common frequencies. Were the controllers in the AWACS, the F-15s, or the Blackhawks, all on a common frequency? And were the controllers in the AWACS sharing information? The point here, of course, is if, and this is supposition, if the controller working the Blackhawks knew, in fact, they were friendly, would he, in fact, automatically have imparted that to the controller working the F-15s, or would the controller working the F-15s know that instantly?

General Shalikashvili: Again, I cannot speculate what actually happened. I know that the air tasking order that orchestrates the whole operation prescribes the frequencies correctly, everyone knew everyone else's frequencies, the Identification Friend or Foe code and mode, to be sure everyone knew what code and mode they were operating were, in fact, was correctly spelled out. But, what actually then happened, I cannot speculate on, and we have to rely on the Board to come up with that.

Q: Under normal procedures, would the F-15s have had to obtain clearance from the AWACS to fire, or could they just do so after having spotted an aircraft visually and identified it?

General Shalikashvili: My understanding is, under normal procedures, they do not have to obtain clearance from the AWACS.

Q: The pilot can make that decision on his own.

General Shalikashvili: That's correct.

Q: ...said that no attempt had been made to contact the helicopters through voice communications, no attempt had been made before firing. Is that still your understanding, that there was no verbal warning? And what does that say about the procedures, and how do those procedures compare with other procedures in the other no-fly zones?

Secretary Perry: That's not my recollection of what I said, Michael. What I said was that one of the questions we would have to get answered, and it's the same question you've been asking here, is why the communications between the helicopter and the AWACS was not effective. Had it been effective, had that procedure worked, there should not have been this accident. There are a half a dozen procedures that we have in place, any one of which, if it had been working, could have prevented this accident. One of them would be the communication with the AWACS. The other, of course, would be identification, visual identification of

the helicopter. A third was the IFF. If the IFF had been operating properly. They didn't have to all operate, just one of them had to operate, and this accident would not have happened. Those are the kind of questions we're trying to answer.

Q: General, what can you tell us about what you know about the ordinary, or regular routine process or procedure that did work under these circumstances? Do you know anything that did work?

General Shalikashvili: In relationship to this particular accident? Well, I wouldn't want to speculate on it. Obviously, I'm not sure that has any particular bearing on it. The tragedy occurred as a result of one or more mistakes or things that had gone wrong, and we'll just have to await the results of the investigation to see just what the things were that didn't function properly and what procedures didn't work correctly.

Q: I'm just reading the transcript. The question was: "Once the two visual inspections had been made, did the fighter pilots attempt to radio the pilots of those helicopters?"

"Secretary Perry: They did not."

"Q: Why not?"

"Secretary Perry: That was not part of their procedure to do that."

Secretary Perry: What I was trying to answer before, was the communication between the AWACS and the helicopters. That's a different issue, which is, should the pilots radio the helicopters, and my answer to that was no.

Q: No, they did not?

Secretary Perry: No, they did not.

Q: But, does that deviate from the other no-fly zones?

Secretary Perry: No. The communication between the helicopter and the AWACS is a different issue from the communications from the pilots to the helicopters.

Q: If these helicopters looked so much alike, especially from above, first, how close did the jets come? And second, how could these pilots be sure enough that they were Iraqi helicopters to fire? How close did they come to the helicopters?

General Shalikashvili: I do not know exactly how close they came to the Iraqi helicopters. I only know that on two passes they identified them, or misidentified them as Hind helicopters. I do not know the distance that separated them at the time that they made that identification.

Q: Did they pass them above, or did they get down at the same level with the helicopters to see them from the side where it's more obvious, the differences are more obvious?

General Shalikashvili: My initial report was that they were doing it from up above, but, I am not sure what the investigation will, in fact, reveal on that. But, the initial report was -- which often is not correct -- that they were doing that from up above.

Q: Was it routine for the Blackhawk helicopters to be carrying an external fuel tank for a flight that range? Or, was it unusual that Blackhawks would be carrying external fuel tanks for such a mission?

General Shalikashvili: I believe that frequently in northern Iraq, because of the distances involved, they carry external fuel tanks.

Q: Can you describe for us what you've done to date to suspend or otherwise alter the operation in northern Iraq?

Secretary Perry: First of all, we suspended the operation, I say we, the CINCEUR suspended the operation in northern Iraq today as a safety measure while they were reviewing all procedures. That will resume again tomorrow.

Secondly, they will be making a modification to the procedures. That we have already determined and already sent them instructions to make one modification to the procedure. That modification I cannot describe to you. These are ongoing operations, and we cannot describe our rules of engagement for you. But, I can tell you that, first of all, we shut down for one day while we're doing the safety review; and secondly, that we've made one particular change in the procedures.

Q: Can we assume that that change is designed to lessen the chance of something like this happening again?

Secretary Perry: Yes.

Q: Also, that relates to another no-fly zone in Bosnia. The situation there is appearing graver today. The latest is that a French jet was hit by ground fire over Gorazde, but returned safely to its carrier, the Clemenceau. And you have directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to look at all the procedures in all the no-fly zones. What is your assessment now of Bosnia, in light of this latest attack? Overall, what is your assessment of Bosnia? And how is this going to affect the no-fly zone system?

Secretary Perry: Relative to the particular question we're talking about here, which is rules of engagement that might lead to a faulty shoot-down, I will only tell you that the rules of engagement in Bosnia are much more stringent. That is, more

elaborate controls limiting the freedom of action of the pilots. I can't say anything more than that.

Q: What is your assessment overall of Bosnia as well? In light of this latest attack.

Secretary Perry: That's a big question. Let me try a small answer to it, which is, that since the two airstrikes on Sunday and Monday in the Gorazde area, there have been two substantial changes in the activity. One of them positive, and one of them negative. The positive one is that the shelling of Gorazde has, in fact, stopped since then. We can't forecast whether it's going to start again today or tomorrow, but it has stopped since that time. Secondly, the Serb forces have begun a whole series of actions to harass the United Nations force.

All of this may be a prelude to more vigorous military activity, or it may be a prelude to getting a better position at the negotiating table. We hope it's the latter, and we hope that negotiations will get started again very quickly.

Q: The French jet was actually hit by ground fire from Gorazde, does this influence, change any [thoughts] you might have?

Secretary Perry: I don't want to comment about what the response to that might be.

Q: Mr. Secretary, Reuters reported just a short while ago from Sarajevo that Gorazde is about to fall, that if nothing is done, it will fall. Serbian forces are moving in from the east and the south and are linking up, and that the defenders, the Muslim defenders, have collapsed. Are you prepared to let the safe haven fall?

Secretary Perry: That's not the information I have. Reuters may very well be correct in that, but that does not correspond to...

Q: [They were quoting] a UN military spokesman, an UNPROFOR spokesman in Sarajevo, saying they're trying to negotiate a ceasefire to try to get the UNPROFOR...

Secretary Perry: All of the activity that I am aware of at this stage is attendant to arriving at a cessation of hostilities not only in Gorazde, but in all of Bosnia. There are intensive discussions underway in that, as we speak, and we sincerely hope that that's what the outcome will be.

Q: Mr. Secretary, going back to Iraq if I may, sir, the pilots of the F-15s, are they undergoing any kind of medical debriefing or counseling at the moment, including psychological or psychiatric... It must be a terrible shock for them.

Secretary Perry: I can't comment on that question.

Q: Can you bring us up-to-date on the situation regarding the remains of the 26 that were killed? I understand they've been taken to Germany. When could the loved ones expect the remains of the family members to come back to the United States?

General Shalikashvili: We don't have a specific time. But, as rapidly as we can, we will ensure that the remains are put on the appropriate aircraft and flown to the United States, and we will announce it to you as soon as we have the dates. We need to make sure that the proper identifications are conducted in Rhein Main, and as soon as that is completed, we are well aware of the importance of a timely, accurate, and sympathetic handling of this whole operation. We'll let you know as soon as we...

Q: I just want to make sure I understand this correctly. The F-15s were authorized to shoot without getting clearance from the AWACS and without interrogating the targets over the radio, is that correct?

General Shalikashvili: The procedures are that the aircraft, after making identification that the aircraft that is being attacked is not friendly, is authorized to attack. It is my understanding that visual identification was made, IFF interrogation was conducted, and no friendly response was received.

Q: No contact with AWACS...

General Shalikashvili: I did not say that. The investigation will have to reveal exactly what happened. You asked me what the procedures are, and what I know from the initial reports was the case.

Q: It's still the same procedure today?

General Shalikashvili: The procedure that...

Q: That pilots can shoot after visual identification and IFF?

General Shalikashvili: It is certainly not a part that I would like to answer in this open forum.

Q: Did the AWACS, in this case, authorize an attack? Did the pilots ask and did the AWACS authorize...

General Shalikashvili: The investigation will have to determine that. You asked me whether that was a requirement, and I said it is not a requirement.

Q: The transponder did not respond with a friendly response, or didn't respond at all in the IFF interrogation?

General Shalikashvili: The investigation will answer that. The aircraft in the air, I am told, did not receive a friendly response.

Q: Did they receive any response?

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General Shalikashvili: I cannot answer that.

Press: Thank you.

(END)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY

INTERVIEWS WITH THE MEDIA
ON FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT
OVER IRAQ

APRIL 15, 1994

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
INTERVIEW WITH PAULA ZAHN ON CBS-TV PROGRAM, "THIS MORNING"
PENTAGON
APRIL 15, 1994

PAULA ZAHN: Segment One this morning: The friendly fire tragedy in Iraq. How could it have happened? We want to go straight to the top for some answers this morning. Defense Secretary William Perry joins us live from the Pentagon.

Good morning, Secretary Perry. Thank you very much for being with us.

SEC. PERRY: Good morning, Paula.

MS. ZAHN: It is clear that this mission was released -- rehearsed, that is. Both sets of pilots were briefed on the mission. Both the jets

and the helicopters were equipped with special electronic devices that would verify their existence. Is it any clearer this morning what went wrong?

SEC. PERRY: It's not going to be truly clear what went wrong for several weeks yet, Paula. We have appointed, as you know, an investigative board. That board, under General Andrus, is already on its way to Turkey, and that investigation will begin today. It will involve a review of the gun cameras. It will involve a review of all of the tapes. We've got tapes of the airplanes, particularly the AWACS airplane, which give us a detailed examination of the communications. There will be interviews of the pilots; a detailed search of the wreckage. We will get to the bottom of this, but it's going to take us a few weeks to do that.

MS. ZAHN: What can you tell us about the interviews that have been done with the pilots and what they reveal?

SEC. PERRY: I can't tell you anything about the interviews with the pilots at this point except to say that both pilots confirmed that they had made two passes to identify the helicopters and made a positive identification that it was a Hind helicopter, which is an Iraqi helicopter. It's very evident that they were wrong. There were errors here. There were human errors not only by the pilots, but perhaps by some of the other aircraft involved in this, in particular the AWACS. And so what is not clear, though, and it's very important, is that we can't distinguish at this point between the role the human errors played in this and the role that procedural errors played.

MS. ZAHN: Can we go back to the individual inspections for a second, because General George Crist, who is a former U.S. commander, says he finds it very difficult to understand how the pilots could confuse the Blackhawks with the Iraqi helicopters.

SEC. PERRY: I find it very difficult to understand also. The helicopters do not look that much like each other. But that's precisely what the investigation is trying -- and it will be answering. And I can assure you it will answer it. And will not only answer that question, but

the dozens of other questions we have. We had a whole set of procedures, including this positive identification, which should have prevented this from happening. So it's going to be a very complex investigation to find out why none of those procedures seemingly took effect, seemingly prevented it from happening.

MS. ZAHN: Once the two visual inspections had been made of the helicopters by the F-15s, did those fighter pilots attempt to radio the pilots of the helicopters?

SEC. PERRY: They did not.

MS. ZAHN: Why not?

SEC. PERRY: That was not part of their procedures to do that. Again, we're not only going to be looking at what happened here -- and that's what the board of investigation is up to -- but I've asked General Shalikashvili to immediately review the procedures we have not only for the northern Iraq no-fly but in the three areas in the world in which we now conduct no-fly operations so that we have the opportunity to make immediate changes in the procedures.

As we distinguish between which of these problems were human errors and which were procedural errors, it's quite possible there was some combination of those. And my big responsibility at this point is, first of all, to get to the bottom of what happened; secondly, to make a full disclosure of the facts to the president, to the Congress, to the public and to the family members. And we have to hold fully accountable anyone who violated the procedures, but we also have to pay attention to the procedures and we may have to correct the procedures as necessary to ensure that this cannot happen again.

MS. ZAHN: Can you confirm for us this morning whether the electronic devices on both the jets and the helicopters were operative?

SEC. PERRY: I would rather hold off the answer to that question for a day or two. We'll have fully confirmed evaluations of important points like that in just a matter of a day or two.

MS. ZAHN: But on a mission of this nature --

SEC. PERRY: (Off mike) -- speculate

based on incomplete reports.

MS. ZAHN: Okay, but based on this type of mission, should they have been operative?

SEC. PERRY: Yes. I can tell you that the helicopter had what we call IFF equipment which should have allowed them to be identified and distinguished as a friend and not a foe and that that should have been sufficient. That was just one of many procedures we had in place that should have prevented this from happening. The point of the investigation is to find out why it did not.

I should also tell you that while we are concerned about getting to the bottom of the facts on this, we're also very concerned about supporting, giving full support to all of the family members and the people who were affected by this tragedy so that we can help to provide them the support in the very trying months ahead for them. Our hearts go out to them.

MS. ZAHN: In closing this morning, some military experts say even though two visual inspections were made, given the speeds at which the F-15s fly, it is conceivable that they might not have been able to positively verify what it was they had just flown by. Is there any truth to that analysis?

SEC. PERRY: They're raising a question as to whether the procedure we had, which these pilots followed, was a stringent enough procedure. And that is one of the very major points which we will be investigating. That's part of General Shalikashvili's investigation, that irrespective of what happened on this particular incident, are our procedures stringent enough so that it cannot happen again in any of the places in the world in which we're conducting no-fly?

MS. ZAHN: All right. Defense Secretary William Perry, thank you very much for joining us this morning.

SEC. PERRY: Thank you, Paula.

MS. ZAHN: We appreciate your time.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
 INTERVIEW WITH CHARLES GIBSON ON ABC-TV PROGRAM, "GOOD MORNING AMERICA"
 PENTAGON
 APRIL 15, 1994

CHARLES GIBSON: A closer look now at the lead story of the morning. A few moments ago, just before we went on the air, I spoke with Defense Secretary William Perry at the Pentagon about the tragic air incident over Iraq yesterday.

(Begin videotaped segments)

SEC. PERRY: The panel, by the way, which is, you know, the investigative board, the president of that board will be General Andress (ph), who is the commander of the Third Air Force. You'll have experts on Army aviation, on F-15s, on AWACS. We also have invited observers from the other countries that were participants in that operation--the French, the Turks, and the British.

This panel has already been convened. It's already on its way to Turkey, and they will, of course, interview all of the people involved in the operation. They will go to the crash site and examine the debris there to see what they can learn from that. They will make a detailed and a full investigation and report back to me.

MR. GIBSON: And I gather everything, therefore, that we talk about now is tentative, pending what the investigative board finds out, but a couple of details. First of all, this was in daylight, the weather perfectly clear, right?

SEC. PERRY: That's what we understand, yes.

MR. GIBSON: Now, have there been Iraqi helicopters active in the northern no-fly zone in recent days?

SEC. PERRY: No.

MR. GIBSON: So this was something of a surprise to the pilots, that they saw helicopters there?

SEC. PERRY: It should have been.

MR. GIBSON: And were there--were the helicopters maneuvering in any way that

might have seemed threatening?

SEC. PERRY: You're asking questions now which are exactly the questions which the investigative board is going to be looking into. At this time, I would just be speculating based on very incomplete information.

MR. GIBSON: Do we know if the pilots of the F-15s made any attempt to contact by radio or talk with or warn the helicopters.

SEC. PERRY: Again, I can just speculate on that answer. Now, the reports that I have at this stage I do not have full confidence in.

MR. GIBSON: What would proper procedure be? Should they try to talk or warn those helicopter pilots?

SEC. PERRY: The point that I'm making, Charlie, is this is a very complex operation involving three different kinds of aircraft, three different groups of aircraft halfway around the world. We just got to the helicopter last night at dark to pick up the remains, so the questions you're--and we're just starting to interview.

MR. GIBSON: I understand, but what I'm asking now is what procedures would normally be in place. If there were a sighting of helicopters, what procedures should groups of aircraft halfway around the world. We just got to the helicopter last night at dark to pick up the remains, so the questions you're -- and we're just starting to interview.

MR. GIBSON: I understand, but what I'm asking now is what procedures would normally be in place. If there were a sighting of helicopters, what procedures should pilots follow? What is the safety checks, really, I'm guessing, or asking, that should be in place to prevent this kind of thing?

SEC. PERRY: I don't want to describe the procedures in detail, but I will say that they involve the pilots making a positive visual identification before firing, and they reported that they had done that. Quite obviously, they were in error, and the whole point of the investigation was to determine how the errors were made and what corrective actions we can take so that they cannot be made again.

Besides the very real probability of human error, there's a possibility that our procedures were not proper, and I have not only put this investigative board together, but I've requested General Shalikashvili to immediately review the operating procedures used not only in northern Iraq, but in the three places in the world where we have no-fly operations going on, and that review is under way immediately. We'll have an answer in a few days.

MR. GIBSON: Mr. Secretary, you talked about the visual sighting. As a layman, I don't know these, but I've seen pictures. We've had them, newspapers around the country have had them -- pictures of the Hind Helicopter and the American helicopter side by side. They look quite different to me.

SEC. PERRY: They look different to me, also. Of course, neither one of us is flying a jet at 400 knots, but, nevertheless, we believe that the procedures, which include visual identification, should have been adequate to have prevented this. And, indeed, that operation's been going on almost three years now without any false identification in the past, so something very wrong happened, and it's precisely the job of the investigation to find out what [went] wrong, to determine human errors and to hold -- and to hold -- and to determine the accountability for those errors and to correct the procedures wherever that is needed.

MR. GIBSON: Again, I don't know if I'm treading into areas that are in the purview of the investigative board and that you haven't been able to determine yet, but there is a third element in all this -- the F-15 fighters, the helicopters, and the AWACS plane that was overhead, that is there to track air traffic -- had the helicopter pilots, do we know, been in contact with the AWACS plane? Had the AWACS plane been charting the path of the helicopters up to a certain point?

SEC. PERRY: I have reports on that which I'm not fully competent on at this point. We should have the full answer to that in just a matter of a day or two as we get -- review the tapes from the AWACS as to exactly what happened in terms of communications. So that's

an -- that's the very first kind of information which the investigative board will review and they should have a rather complete picture to that -- on that aspect of it within a day or two.

MR. GIBSON: Do we know if the pilots of the F-15s had contacted the AWACS about their intent to fire?

SEC. PERRY: Yes, we do. They did.

MR. GIBSON: They did. And is the decision made by the pilots of the F-15s, is it made in the AWACS, or is it made at a higher level?

SEC. PERRY: Answering that question involves describing the rules of engagement, which I cannot do at this time.

MR. GIBSON: All right. One other question -- a system of -- again, which I don't know a lot about -- IFF, Identify Friend or Foe. There is supposed to be electronic equipment on planes to identify them as friend or foe, right?

SEC. PERRY: There was -- not only is supposed to be, but there was an IFF equipment on the helicopters, and that should have -- that's one of the procedures we had that should have prevented this accident. Quite obviously it did not, and so a major issue of the investigative board was to find out why the IFF by itself could not have prevented this attack.

There are eight or nine different procedures or systems, any one of which could have prevented this accident, so it's a very -- it's a mystery to us at this stage why it could have happened, but we will get the answer to it.

The job of this board is to get to the bottom of this and to make full accountability of it, and I will make, as I get this information, full disclosure to the president, to the Congress, to the public. I also want to get this information to the family members. We are providing all of the support for them that we can in the trying months ahead. The one particular aspect of it is to get a full disclosure to them of what happened.

MR. GIBSON: And, Mr. Secretary, just before we go, a personal reaction to all this. You're new to the job. Something like this happens. How do you feel? What happens?

SEC. PERRY: Well, it's a tragedy. I

mean, it's just like getting kicked in the stomach. It's not just myself, of course. Obviously, the family members are profoundly affected by this, but in the military, in the Pentagon, we are family, and when we lose family members like this, and particularly when we lose them under these tragic circumstances, it's very hard to take.

(End videotaped segment)

MR. GIBSON: The secretary of Defense just a few moments before we went on the air.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
 INTERVIEW WITH MATT LAUER ON NBC-TV PROGRAM, "TODAY"
 PENTAGON
 APRIL 15, 1994

MATT LAUER: On Close-up this morning: Death by friendly fire. The accidental downing of two U.S. helicopters in northern Iraq by two U.S. jetfighters on Thursday has left more questions than answers. The man responsible for coming up with the answers is Defense Secretary William Perry, and this morning he is in the briefing room at the Pentagon.

Mr. Secretary, good morning. Thanks for joining us.

SEC. PERRY: Thank you, Matt. Good morning.

MR. LAUER: We understand the investigation into this incident is already underway. What can you tell us this morning about what happened Thursday?

SEC. PERRY: Well, we have, as you indicated, many more questions than we have answers. We have questions about why the helicopter wasn't in communication with the AWACS. We have questions about why the IFF wasn't apparently functioning. And we have questions about why the pilots misidentified these helicopters. The whole point is trying to get an answer to these questions, and answers in which we can have confidence.

We did initiate the investigation yesterday. I directed General Joulwan to

appoint an investigative board. That board has already been appointed. It's under the direction of Major General Andrus, who's already on the way to Turkey. That whole team, with the team of experts, will be in Turkey for the weeks to come. And their job will be to get the answers to those questions.

MR. LAUER: Let's take the questions one at a time, if we can. The reports are that the U.S. jetfighters twice circled the helicopters to make visual identification and then resultingly said that they were Iraqi Hind helicopters. How could that happen in broad daylight?

SEC. PERRY: That's exactly what the investigation is designed to answer. At this point I could only speculate on an answer, and these questions are too important to try to answer by speculation. We have to get to the facts. And our job is to get to the bottom of this. I feel that I am accountable to the president, to the Congress and to the public to get a full accounting of what happened here and take corrective action so it cannot happen again. And that's what I intend to do.

MR. LAUER: Let me ask you one more specific question about the incident, and then we'll move on to broader issues. But you mentioned the IFF transponder that is aboard the helicopter that is supposed to identify it as a friendly aircraft. Do you have any indication that it was in operation, or was it turned off?

SEC. PERRY: We don't have the answer to that question. That's a very good question. It's going to require a detailed examination, including an examination of the helicopter.

MR. LAUER: Let's take a look at the climate under which this incident occurred. Have there been any specific provocations from the Iraqis that would have maybe made the pilots in this situation more tense? Have the Iraqis attacked the Kurds recently, in recent weeks?

SEC. PERRY: This operation was going on the other day much as it has been for the last almost three years. There have been provocations in the past. There have been incidents in the past. But there was nothing that would have made this day stand out in particular.

MR. LAUER: Reports this morning were that there have been no Iraqi helicopter violations of that no-fly zone since it was installed back in 1991. What was the hurry in shooting down two helicopters?

SEC. PERRY: That's again a very important question and a question to which we have to get the answer. That answer obviously has to come from an interview, a detailed interview, of the people who were involved. There was nothing about the external circumstances, though, that indicated any particular tension or any particular alertness on that day.

MR. LAUER: Mr. Secretary, U.S. forces are involved, as you well know, in other parts of the world. Should we be concerned that a similar incident could take place, for example, in the skies over Bosnia?

SEC. PERRY: I have -- first of all, I might say that the procedures over Bosnia are different and are less likely to allow an incident like this to happen. But more importantly --

MR. LAUER: In what way are they different?

SEC. PERRY: They're different in that they require greater -- I'm hesitating here because I cannot really -- I should not really describe the rules of engagement which we have. These are ongoing operations and it is not appropriate to discuss them. I will tell you that they're different. And I will also tell you, more importantly, that I have requested General Shalikashvili to immediately review these procedures, these rules of engagement, for all of the operations undergoing now in which we're enforcing a no-fly. We're doing that now in three places in the world -- in Bosnia, northern Iraq and southern Iraq. And we will be making a very rapid, very intensive investigation of our procedures for all three of them.

MR. LAUER: Footnote to this; have you suspended flights over Iraq because of this?

SEC. PERRY: We have not. But we have made some changes already in the procedures there. I'm not free to discuss them, but we have already made some changes.

MR. LAUER: Mr. Secretary, in this

morning's New York Times, Charles Schroeder, a retired U.S. Army colonel, is quoted as saying, "We are reaching the limits of the ability of the human being to control the destructive forces at their command. Modern technology has simply evolved so fast that it is overtaxing human capacities." What's your comment on that?

SEC. PERRY: That's an interesting observation. I do not think it applies to the situation that occurred, the accident that occurred yesterday. I believe that the operation that we're trying to conduct and the procedures we had on it should have been adequate to provide that control. It has been adequate for the almost three years it's been conducted. I think there must have been some failure, either human errors or failures of not following the procedures, and we intend to get to the bottom and find the full answer to that. It may be that our procedures need to be modified, too, and we will also be looking at that.

MR. LAUER: All right. Defense Secretary William Perry, we thank you for taking time out of your schedule to join us this morning.

SEC. PERRY: Thank you, Matt.

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY

TRIP TO KOREA AND JAPAN

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